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What does the Hogwarts School of Witchcraft and Wizardryl-a
very different place of learning from the one in which most of us work,
to be sure-have to do with academic freedom? Superficial appearances
notwithstanding, Hogwarts is like our universities in one critical respect
relevant to academic freedom: it has its own rules and ethic for learning
to "do" magic in the proper way.
As readers of the Harry Potter stories well know, the rules and eth-
ics of magic distinguish it from the "dark arts," whose practitioners form
a distinctly separate normative community. Furthermore, each specialty
within Hogwarts-Charms, Potions, Transfiguration-has its own disci-
plinary constraints. Transfiguration is not, for example, to be used as
punishment: reprobate students must not be changed into ferrets. 2 More-
over, the rules of the discipline are fiercely defended. Anyone who does
not adhere to the constraints will not be included in the discipline for
long. As Professor Minerva McGonagall tells her students in Transfigu-
ration, "Anyone messing around in my class will leave and not come
back."'3 In other words, Hogwarts is recognizable as a community in
which people learn how to live in the special world of magic.
4
* Professor of Law, University of Colorado School of Law. I gratefully acknowledge
the research assistance of Sarah Sorum, Alaina Stedillie, and Michelle Witter. In addition, I
lovingly acknowledge the insights and inspiration of my father, John C. Calhoun, Jr., Distin-
guished Professor Emeritus of Texas A&M University. Among my colleagues, special thanks
are extended to Laura Spitz. Of course, I also learned much from the comments of all who
participated in the Byron White Center conference.
1. See generally J.K. ROWLrNG, HARRY POTTER AND THE SORCERER'S STONE (Arthur
A. Levine Books 1998).
2. J.K. ROWLING, HARRY POTTER AND THE GOBLET OF FIRE 204-06 (Scholastic Books
2000).
3. ROWLING, supra note I, at 134.
4. See Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term: Foreword: Nomos and Narra-
tive, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 6 (1983) (to be part of a normative community, one must "know
how to live in it"). See also THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS
174-210 (2d ed. 1970) (describing a scientific paradigm and ways of doing science within a
particular community); James Boyd White, Legal Knowledge, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1396 passim
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Hogwarts offers us a simple reminder that faculty in our universities
also live their professional lives within disciplinary constraints and
norms. Physicists have one methodological approach to studying auto-
mobile accidents; professors of journalism and law will each have their
own approved disciplinary perspective on the important questions to ask
about such events, as will social scientists. Any given professor's aca-
demic research and teaching are constrained by disciplinary limitations
on content, viewpoint, and subject matter; research and teaching are ex-
pected to be pursued in accordance with accepted disciplinary methods
and behaviors. The discipline links faculty physically located at different
sites throughout the world and is arguably more important to faculty than
any specific university home.
Despite its importance in academic life, the academic freedom de-
bate frequently neglects the discipline. In this article, I will bring the
discipline to the foreground in order to show how the academic freedom
debate might change were the discipline a more central figure in it. This
is not to say that the discipline per se is the holder of a right of academic
freedom. Rather, my thesis is simply that if we frame the academic free-
dom debate with reference to the reality of the discipline, the rights of
professors and universities will be open to a more vigorous defense
against external threats. 5
Focusing on the empirical reality of the discipline shifts the aca-
demic freedom argument away from a consideration of First Amendment
speech rights and toward First Amendment associational rights. As the
(2002) (asserting that those who do law use rules to claim meaning for experience and thereby
make law their own).
5. Contemporary events provide a variety of examples of external threats that put the
integrity of the academic discipline at risk. The University of Colorado, for example, staved
off a bill based on David Horowitz's Academic Freedom Bill of Rights by preemptively enter-
ing into a Memorandum of Understanding providing that the university was committed to en-
suring that the academic freedom rights of students are respected. For examples of creation-
science mandates, see Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393
U.S. 97 (1968); and Kitzmiller v. Dover Area School District, 379 F. Supp. 2d 680 (M.D. Pa.
2005).
The Bush administration's national commission on higher education has recently pro-
posed that student achievement tests be used to measure performance of university students.
See Kelly Field, Educators Cast a Wary Eye at US. Panel, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Oct. 14,
2005, at 1. See also Robert M. O'Neil, Academic Freedom and National Security in a Time of
Crisis, 89 ACADEME 21, 21-24 (2003) (discussing federal regulation of classified research,
regulation of export licenses for cryptography, the treatment of "sensitive but unclassified"
information, and visa restrictions), available at http://www.aaup.org/statements/REPORTS/
91 lreport.htm; Diana Pullin, Accountability, Autonomy, and Academic Freedom in Educator
Preparation Programs, 55 J. TcHR. EDUC. 300 (2004) (discussing the federal government's
imposition of accountability requirements and mandates concerning what "counts" as good




other articles associated with the White Center conference show, speech
rights are critically important to the academic freedom debate. 6 Yet they
are not the only rights that matter.
Because the discipline is, by definition, the artifact of a collective,
expressive enterprise, associational interests are properly considered
alongside free speech in the academic freedom debate. Indeed, a disci-
plinary-based, associational rights analysis has some potential advan-
tages over a free speech analysis. Associational rights, for example, may
be more fact-sensitive than category-driven and thereby afford constitu-
tional protection to unique institutions such as academia; in contrast, free
speech doctrine has generally been thought not to extend special privi-
leges to preferred speakers.7 An associational rights analysis may avoid
the paradoxes and difficulties of free speech precepts such as content and
viewpoint neutrality, which seem difficult to reconcile with the regulated
academic marketplace.
8
To illustrate my arguments, I will draw examples from Rumsfeld v.
Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc.9 FAIR involved a
challenge to the federal Solomon Amendment, which effectively requires
law schools to give military recruiters access to their placement ser-
vices.10 The controversy thus raised academic freedom issues in a single
discipline. The plaintiffs in FAIR employed an associational rights
analysis as part of their academic freedom debate. They did not, how-
ever, adequately and cohesively conceptualize the discipline and, as a re-
sult, relinquished the potential for an illuminating associational rights
perspective on the controversy. For that reason, the Supreme Court of
the United States concluded that FAIR "plainly overstates the expressive
nature of [its] activity and the impact of the Solomon Amendment on
it."1 1
This article attempts to show how a discipline-based, associational
rights analysis might have enriched the understanding of the academic
freedom debate at the heart of the FAIR dispute. With respect to FAIR, a
disciplinary perspective would have ensured that core associational val-
6. See, e.g., J. Peter Byrne, Constitutional Academic Freedom After Grutter: Getting
Real About the "Four Freedoms" of a University, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 929 (2006); Alan K.
Chen, Bureacracy and Distrust: Germaneness and the Paradoxes of the Academic Freedom
Doctrine, 77 U. COLO. L. REv. 955 (2006); Robert M. O'Neil, Bias, "Balance, " and Beyond:
New Threats to Academic Freedom, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 985 (2006); Frederick Schauer, Is
There A Right to Academic Freedom, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 907 (2006).
7. See Schauer, supra note 6. Much of the discussion pertaining to the other papers in
the Conference addressed fixed doctrinal categories employed in First Amendment analysis.
8. Id.
9. 126 S. Ct. 1297 (2006) [hereinafter FAIR].
10. See infra text accompanying notes 70-92.
11. FAIR, 126 S. Ct. at 1313.
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ues pertaining to the role obligations of those who "do" law in different
settings are not neglected, trivialized, or seen as "small potatoes. '12 I
also hope that the FAIR examples will show, more generally, how a dis-
ciplinary perspective might enrich the academic freedom debate in other
disputes. 13
I. THE ROLE OF THE DISCIPLINE IN ACADEMIC LIFE
The discipline has a role to play in the academic freedom debate
and deserves reflection. 14 A university consists of academic units organ-
12. Andrew P. Morriss, The Market for Legal Education & Freedom ofAssociation: Why
the "Solomon Amendment" Is Constitutional and Law Schools Are Not Expressive Associa-
tions, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 415, 469 (2005) (disagreeing with the disciplinary per-
spective of this article).
13. FAIR, 126 S. Ct. 1297, dealing as it does with topics and activities that tend to evoke
passionate reaction, is an especially useful controversy for my purposes, precisely because it
puts my thesis to a rigorous test.
14. This article does not undertake an empirical study of the role of the discipline in aca-
demic life. It only offers sufficient evidence of the role to support the thesis that a discipline-
based academic freedom argument is one that should be pursued in constitutional analysis. I
adhere to the view that constitutional analysis will rest on a sounder footing if it is grounded in
empirical reality. See Jason Mazzone, Freedom's Associations, 77 WASH. L. REV. 639 (2002)
(particularly recommending empirical perspectives in dealing with the right of association);
Frederick Schauer, Principles, Institutions, and the First Amendment, 112 HARV. L. REV. 84
(1998) (arguing that a focus on factual reality of institutions rather than categories of First
Amendment speech might lead to better constitutional analysis and behavior); Timothy Zick,
Constitutional Empiricism: Quasi-Neutral Principles and Constitutional Truths, 82 N.C. L.
REV. 115 (2003) (describing constitutional law as an empirical enterprise).
Much legal scholarship purporting to deal with reality rests more on assumption than em-
pirical fact. See, e.g., Deborah L. Rhode, Legal Scholarship, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1327 (2002).
Too much judicial analysis similarly finds its basis more in assumptions than empirical fact.
See, e.g., David L. Faigman, "Normative Constitutional Fact-Finding: "Exploring the Empiri-
cal Component of Constitutional Interpretation, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 541 (1991); Daniel Hal-
berstam, Commercial Speech, Professional Speech, and the Constitutional Status of Social In-
stitutions, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 771 (1999). I agree that full confirmation of the validity of this
article's argument may require additional empirical study. I am certainly mindful of Professor
Alan Chen's reminder during this Conference that the Harry Potter stories have another lesson:
that one must avoid taking as truth what is only an illusory reflection of dreams in the Mirror
of Erised. See ROWLING, supra note 1, at 213-14 (Professor Dumbledore explains that those
who have relied on reflections seen in the Mirror of Erised have "wasted away before it, en-
tranced by what they have seen, or been driven mad, not knowing if what it shows is real or
even possible"). There are certainly reasons to suspect that the discipline of law-which is the
specific focus of this article-may not have as fixed or firm a core set of principles as do other
disciplines. See, e.g., J. Peter Byrne, Academic Freedom and Political Neutrality in Law
Schools: An Essay on Structure and Ideology in Professional Education, 43 J. LEGAL ED. 315
(1993) (commenting that law may perhaps be considered the least scientific or the most hu-
manistic of disciplines); Robert Post, Legal Scholarship and the Practice of Law, 63 U. COLO.
L. REV. 615, 621-23 (1992) (commenting that law may not have the same institutional, con-
sensus-building mechanisms that other disciplines have). See also, Larry Alexander, Aca-
demic Freedom, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 883 (2006) (arguing that post-modernism has so tainted
many disciplines that one can no longer believe in the existence of any disciplinary standards).
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ized by discipline. 15 It contains, for example, departments of English,
Classics, Microbiology, Chemistry, Mathematics, and Mechanical Engi-
neering; it also is home to schools of Music, Education, and Law.
Within any one of these academic units, there are also disciplinary sub-
specialties. Within a psychology department, for example, there are both
clinical and behavioral psychologists. Thus, any given discipline is
smaller than its home university.
At the same time, the discipline is larger than and transcends the
university. It includes persons drawn from all universities (both public
and private). It includes those who practice the discipline outside the
academy and who collaborate through learned societies and other institu-
tions. It even transcends the national, geographic boundaries of any spe-
cific constitutional regime. 16 Indeed, the discipline may be considered
an artifact of a consensus reached among all of its affiliates-within the
university and without--on important matters. The consensus is infor-
mal and may be reflected more in how disciplinary affiliates interact with
each other in a mutual spirit and method of inquiry than in their agree-
ment on the substance of disciplinary issues. 17 Even when affiliates do
not agree with each other substantively, they remain within the discipline
insofar as they continue to work cooperatively on their differences, in ac-
cordance with the norms of the discipline.
For an analysis of the FAIR controversy that has a completely different take on what legal edu-
cation is all about, see Morriss, supra note 12, which argues that law schools, the ABA, and
the AALS are a commercial oligopoly that engages in cartel behavior. If Morriss' oligopoly
analogy is valid, the disciplinary focus of this article is ill-conceived. Even Morriss, however,
notes that law schools have chosen to attach themselves to universities precisely because they
have shunned a student-as-consumer model of legal education in favor of a more academic
model that stresses "law reform and scholarship." Id. at 432-33.
15. A department (or a professional school or college) is itself distinct from a discipline.
It is organized along disciplinary lines but, as a constituent unit of a larger university, serves
values and pursues objectives that are not necessarily those of the discipline itself. A disci-
pline benefits from its connections to the university, for a specialty needs to engage with the
whole of knowledge to have meaning. KARL JASPERS, THE IDEA OF THE UNIVERSITY 44-46
(Karl W. Deutsch ed., Beacon Press 1959) (1946). See also William G. Tierney & Robert A.
Rhoads, Faculty Socialization as a Cultural Process: A Mirror of Institutional Commitment, in
ASHE-ERIC HIGHER EDUCATION REPORT, at 12 (ASHE-ERIC Higher Education Report No.
6, 1993) ("[A] French physicist and a Canadian chemist.., are socialized to share common
work-related languages and customs more than would the French physicist with a countryman
who is a banker.").
16. I am indebted to Professor Sienho Yee for this reminder, which is so important to
how one might think about the associational rights and interests that are implicated by efforts
of the government to limit the discourse and consensus-building processes of a discipline. For
a discussion of the right of association in international law, see HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, THE
NEGLECTED RIGHT: FREEDOM OFA/SSoCIATION IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
(1997), http://www.humansrightsfirst.org/pubs/descriptions/neglrt.htm.
17. For this way of phrasing significant disciplinary connections, I am again indebted to
Professor Yee.
20061
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As other scholars have observed, "[t]he culture of the discipline is
the primary source of faculty identity and expertise and typically engen-
ders stronger bonds than those developed with the institution of employ-
ment, particularly in large universities. ' 18 Disciplines are, for the most
part, the final arbiter of what "counts" to a faculty member. 19 The disci-
pline purports to dictate everything important to what individual profes-
sors will "do" and how they will "live" within their discipline. 20 The
discipline determines what "counts" as an important question or topic to
pursue in research or teaching, how questions should be asked, what
methods can validly be used to find answers, and what criteria are used
to judge the legitimacy of conclusions. Although all disciplines share a
commitment to honesty and truth,2 1 each discipline is permitted to define
the concept of truth and how best to reach it in discipline-specific
ways.22 A given discipline inculcates its own norms for determining
what counts or is valuable and when one can trust in the truth of a par-
ticular matter. For example, scientists and lawyers may use entirely dif-
ferent methods and standards for determining whether a causal relation-
ship has been established between exposure to a toxic substance and a
particular disease.2
3
18. See George D. Kuh & Elizabeth J. Whitt, The Invisible Tapestry: Culture in Ameri-
can Colleges and Universities, in ASHE-ERIC HIGHER EDUCATION REPORTS (ASHE-ERIC
Higher Education Reports No. 1, 1988), quoted in Tierney & Rhoads, supra note 15, at 14. It
is commonplace within academia that disciplinary connections give faculty the wherewithal to
cope with non-disciplinary controversies and politics at their home institutions.
19. Tierney & Rhoads, supra note 15, at 13 (setting forth some classic definitions of a
discipline: a discipline may be defined in terms of organizational form; with reference to
shared concepts, methods, and fundamental aims; or by bodies of ideas, values, and profes-
sional styles).
20. See General Report of the Committee on Academic Freedom and Academic Tenure, 1
AAUP Bull. 17 (1915), reprinted in 53 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 393 (1990) (in identifying
what is important to academic freedom, the AAUP stresses the central role of the discipline,
fellow-experts, specialists, and fields of expertise throughout, and notes that the responsibility
of the university teacher relates to the judgments of his own profession).
21. See BERNARD WILLIAMS, TRUTH AND TRUTHFULNESS: AN ESSAY IN GENEALOGY
(2002) (discussing this feature of academic life). Williams observes, for example, that the im-
portant market forces in academia are processes that support a search for truth, as seen by dis-
ciplines. Id. at 214. He notes that the integrity of all disciplines rests heavily on transparency
rather than "opacity, mystification, [or] large-scale deception." Id. at 232.
22. Enterprises, academic or otherwise, dealing with truth can be structured differently.
As WILLIAMS, supra note 21, at 213, says, one can debate "what systems favour truth-
discovery in a given area."
23. See, e.g., Jo~lle Anne Moreno, Beyond the Polemic Against Junk Science: Navigating
the Oceans that Divide Science and Law with Justice Breyer at the Helm, 81 B.U. L. REv.
1033, 1060-65 (2001). White, supra note 4, at 1398, 1431, observes that the ends of law are
perhaps justice as much as truth, and that the methods of law are adversarial, both of which
constitute significant differences between law and science.
[Vol. 77
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Disciplines also set standards of behavior and establish role obliga-
tions for disciplinary affiliates. Indeed, a discipline takes its identity
from an internal, disciplinary consensus on ethical norms and profes-
sional behavior.24 If disciplinary affiliates conform to their role obliga-
tions, they can be said to live appropriately within the discipline. If not,
they are in trouble, even if they have brilliantly and effectively made use
of a complicated body of theoretical knowledge. These role obligations
are the reason for the standard assertion that privileges, such as academic
freedom, entail responsibilities.
25
Faculty members build their reputations within their discipline and
do substantial work outside the university where they are employed.
26
They spend significant time developing close disciplinary associations
through conferences, inter-institutional collaborative research, and visits
and informal consultation with disciplinary peers employed at other insti-
tutions. As they do their work, an informal and ongoing process of peer
review occurs. Through discussions, seminars, and meetings-and as
graduate students mentored by faculty at one university assume profes-
sorships at other institutions-faculty within a given discipline come to
know and judge the merits of a given professor's contributions to the dis-
cipline. More formal methods of establishing reputation within a disci-
pline also exist. For example, publication in most disciplinary journals is
conditioned on review and acceptance of the merits of submitted work by
highly-regarded members of the discipline. In addition, it is frequently
impossible for faculty to secure research funding from government or
other external sources without first securing the approval of disciplinary
peers.
2 7
24. See Tierney & Rhoads, supra note 15, at 13.
25. This disciplinary fact of life is especially important in professionally-oriented disci-
plines. See, e.g., CHARLEs BOSK, FORGIVE AND REMEMBER: MANAGING MEDICAL FAILURE
(1979) (describing what "counts" as an error in the medical subspecialty of surgery; discussing
the background norms, understandings, and values invoked in teaching hospitals to categorize
errors as either blameworthy or mere misfortune; and holding that normative error, i.e., a fail-
ure of physicians to discharge their role obligations conscientiously, is every bit as, if not more
important than, technical error, i.e., a failure to apply a theoretic body of knowledge correctly).
See also Byrne, supra note 14, at 339 ("An account of academic freedom for law schools that
ignores our professional obligations must become either a platitude or a denial of responsibil-
ity.").
26. Tierney & Rhoads, supra note 15, at 46 ("The disciplinary ... culture is where meet-
ings, journals, book publishing, and scholarly networking occur.").
27. For descriptions of the formal and informal processes of peer review, see Brief Amici
Curiae of The American Association of University Professors et al., in Support of Appellees at
5 passim, Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987) (No. 85-1513) [hereinafter Edwards
AAUP Brief]; Brief for The American Association for the Advancement of Science et al., as
Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent at 14-15, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
509 U.S. 579 (1995) (No. 92-102) [hereinafter Daubert AAAS Brief]. See also Tierney &
Rhoads supra note 15, generally and at 50 (one becomes known in one's field via publications,
2006]
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Acceptance in the scholarly discourse of a discipline is critical to
faculty. The discipline consists of a continuing conversation and dispu-
tation, which is how knowledge is developed and truth is established.28
An individual professor's reputation is established insofar as he or she is
deemed qualified to participate in the continuing discussion of the disci-
pline. Simply by refusing to debate a pretender to the discipline, an es-
teemed member of the discipline can thwart introduction of a particular
idea or approach to a way of "doing" or "living" within the discipline.
Stephen Jay Gould and Richard Dawkins, for example, famously refused
even to debate so-called "creation scientists" because they believed that
engagement in a debate-in and of itself, irrespective of which side
might win or lose the debate-would lend disciplinary, that is, scientific,
legitimacy to creation "science" and its advocates.
29
The university takes significant direction from the discipline. 30 The
education of graduate students destined to become part of the professor-
ate is organized around disciplinary specialties that socialize students
into the norms of a discipline. 31 At hiring, individuals are brought into
departments organized by disciplinary specialty. Curricular development
reviewing articles of others, presentations, committee work, external reviews at tenure time,
and drafts of articles). For an example of government funding standards, see National Insti-
tutes of Health, NIH Research Planning. Scientific Peer Review, NIH, Apr. 27, 2005,
http://www.nih.gov/about/researchplanning.htm.
28. See, e.g., JASPERS, supra note 15, at 64 (scholarship is maintained through discussion
and disputation); WILLIAMS, supra note 21, at 225 (discussing the nature of the scholars' con-
tinuing conversation and positing that a statement is true if it is the one on which everyone
would agree if they discussed freely for an unlimited period of time). See generally Edwards
AAUP Brief, supra note 27; Daubert AAAS Brief, supra note 27, at 12 ("[science is] a proc-
ess for proposing and refining theoretical explanations;" it is an "endless search for universal
laws and a more inclusive coherent system of hypotheses;" and "only through a process of
continual challenge" can there be confidence in scientific validity).
29. See Richard Dawkins, Why I Won't Debate Creationists, 23 FREE INQUIRY 12 (2002)
(noting that creation science advocates would see mere participation in a debate with an hon-
ored representative of the sciences as a victory for creation science because participation
would signal legitimacy). For another perspective on this issue, see Stephen Jay Gould, Dar-
winian Fundamentalism, 44 THE NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS, June 12, 1997, at 34 (setting
forth the conditions under which debate should occur).
30. Why universities defer to disciplinary influence in their internal affairs is something
of a mystery (and beyond the scope of this article). One might speculate that they acquiesce
in-and even protect-the influence of the discipline because they understand that their own
standing and reputation derive from the disciplinary standing and reputation of individual fac-
ulty members. Perhaps they defer to the discipline because administrators are drawn from fac-
ulty ranks, retain connections to their home departments and disciplines, and expect to return
to their discipline at some point in their career. Perhaps they defer because of the accrediting
power of formally organized disciplinary entities.
31. See Tierney & Rhoads, supra note 15, at 13-14 (referencing T. BECHER, ACADEMIC
TRIBES AND TERRITORIES: INTELLECTUAL ENQUIRY AND THE CULTURES OF DISCIPLINES
(1989)). Graduate students take into account the prospects of having their work approved and
selected for publication by disciplinary peers as they select and pursue their dissertations.
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is dependent on the disciplinary research and teaching agendas of indi-
vidual professors.
32
The university especially acquiesces in the influence of the disci-
pline in its tenuring processes, which rest heavily on a system of disci-
plinary peer review. 33 The opinions of established scholars in the disci-
pline are a more important measurement of quality and accomplishment
than the opinions of administrators or faculty from other disciplines
within the tenuring institution. 34 Even the criteria for what counts as
valid scholarly work are not established institution by institution, except
in the most general of terms,35 and changes to a university's system of
tenure are usually possible only if acceptable to and compatible with the
discipline. 36 Moreover, it is not easy for a university to fire a tenured
professor. 37 Tenured professors can generally be terminated only for
32. I am indebted to John C. Calhoun, Jr. for the following reminders. New courses are
typically the brainchild of individual professors responding to new disciplinary directions and
developments external to the university. Moreover, the faculty who come together to offer
interdisciplinary courses are typically driven by disciplinary demands. Perhaps, for example,
upper-division courses in a variety of disciplines require an understanding of math that can be
provided only if a basic math course for undergraduates is tailored to respond to the needs of
each of the disciplines. Of course, the influence of the discipline can have less positive effects
as well. Consider the possibility that because of the influence of the discipline, universities are
notoriously poor organizers of knowledge.
33. The discipline affects more than tenured or tenure-track faculty. Within universities,
there are also adjunct professors, clinical professors, and lecturers. See, e.g., JOE BERRY,
RECLAIMING THE IVORY TOWER: ORGANIZING ADJUNCTS TO CHANGE HIGHER EDUCATION 5
(2005) (sometime during the 1990s, the majority of faculty became "contingent," i.e., not full-
time, tenure-track, or tenured). Notwithstanding different categories of faculty, faculty within
given disciplines are held together by a commitment to disciplinary norms.
34. See, e.g., Memorandum from the Office of Faculty Affairs of the University of Colo-
rado at Boulder on Reappointment, Tenure and Promotion of Tenure Track Faculty (2005)
(emphasizing external letters of recommendation in the University of Colorado's tenuring
process), available at http://www.colorado.edu/facultyaffairs/deskref/part5reappoint-teure_
promo ttrack.htm. The University of Colorado's tenure and tenure-related policies are typical
of other research universities. See Independent Report on Tenure-Related Processes at the
University of Colorado 23 (Apr. 24, 2006) (concluding that "with few exceptions, University
of Colorado processes align with consensus/best practices among the benchmark institutions").
35. See, e.g., University of Colorado Board of Regents, Laws of Regents Appendix A:
Standards, Processes, and Procedures Document, (adopted 1974, last amended 2000) (detail-
ing the University of Colorado's criteria of excellence), available at http://www.cusys.edu/
regents/Laws/AppendixA.html; Memorandum from the Office of Faculty Affairs on Reap-
pointment, Tenure, and Promotion of Tenure Track Faculty, supra note 34 ("[T]he definition
of the terms 'meritorious' and 'excellence' are, of course, discipline specific.").
36. See Scott Jaschik, A Tenure Reform Plan with Legs, INSIDE HIGHER ED, Jan. 5, 2006
(comparing a failed university proposal for tenure reform to the much better prospects for re-
form initiated by the Modem Language Association), available at http://insidehighered.com/
news/2006/01/05/tenure.
37. See, e.g., Stanley Fish, Chickens: the Ward Churchill and Larry Summers Story,
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., May 13, 2005, at B9 (noting the citizen's mistaken view of the uni-
versity's power to rid itself of a troublesome professor), available at http://chronicle.com/
weekly/v5 I/i36/36b00901 .htm.
2006]
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cause, which, other than egregious misbehavior such as sexual harass-
ment, requires some sort of conduct deemed unprofessional by the disci-
pline.3
8
The influence of the discipline is not, of course, without challenge.
Just as the bureaucratic apparatus of the Ministry of Magic frequently in-
trudes on Hogwarts, so do external factors affect our universities and the
disciplines within them. For example, the university frequently and nec-
essarily pursues broad objectives, such as maintaining athletic programs,
sustaining profitable connections to the business community, and re-
sponding to legislative bodies, whose fulfillment can put pressure on
specific disciplines. Legislators may wish to constrain the way in which
professors interact with the larger community; the commercial world
may entice entrepreneurial faculty to seek commercial gains from their
intellectual creations; and private or public donors to research may have
their own, extra-disciplinary goals in mind. These pressures can put the
integrity of the discipline at risk, especially insofar as the discipline pur-
ports to be concerned with the intrinsic value of knowledge and the pur-
suit of research for its own sake.
39
Notwithstanding these pressures, the discipline is still a signifi-
cant-although some would argue weakening-force in academic life.
40
It undeniably and closely continues to constrain the professor who claims
an affiliation with it. Although in the conventional view, a university
"undertakes to stimulate the whole universe of speech and ideas," 41 ideas
38. See, e.g., David A. Groth, Misconduct in Research and Authorship, UNIVERSITY OF
COLORADO, Dec. 31, 1998, http://www.cu.edu/policies/Academic/misconduct.html (defining
research misconduct at the University of Colorado as conduct involving a serious deviation
from practices "commonly accepted in the research community for proposing, conducting, or
reporting research").
39. For an interesting discussion of these external pressures, see Suzy Harris, Rethinking
Academic Identities in Neo-Liberal Times, TEACHING IN HIGHER EDUCATION, 421-33 (2005).
Harris, addressing the experiences and structures of education in the UK, notes that although
the university was historically the sole physical site of knowledge production, others are now
challenging who can define what counts as useful knowledge. For example, "[p]rofessional
expertise and intellectual property are increasingly based on market definitions," and "[t]he
distinction between corporate identities and academic identities is no longer very clear." Id. at
424.
40. Compare the formal commitment to policies that seek to protect professors from ex-
ternal pressures in government-funded research, e.g., AAUP, On Preventing Conflicts of Inter-
est in Government-Sponsored Research at Universities, in AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF
UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS POLICY DOCUMENTS & REPORTS 158-60 (1984), and in judicial
doctrine, Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 200 (1991) ("Similarly, we have recognized that the
university is a traditional sphere of free expression so fundamental to the functioning of our
society that the Government's ability to control speech within that sphere by means of condi-
tions attached to the expenditure of Government funds is restricted by the vagueness and over-
breadth doctrines of the First Amendment.").
41. Bd. of Regents v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 232 (2000).
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are pursued in an extremely structured way.42 Marketplace-of-ideas
metaphors notwithstanding, 43 professors do not throw ideas out, willy-
nilly, into a laissez-faire market.
I like Bernard Williams' description of the type of regulated market
that operates within the discipline and academia itself. Williams calls it
an "idealized market" in which the worth of ideas is measured by disci-
plinary acceptance rather than dollars. 44 In other words, in the idealized
market, a faculty member's work is deemed worthy not because some
miscellaneous, external consumer of information might choose to buy
it-because it suits some external consumer's preferences-but because
the affiliates of a discipline as a whole choose to accept it. According to
Williams, international scientific inquiry is a good example of the ideal-
ized market.45 There is "an increasingly high entry fee in terms of train-
ing," and the market contains "a powerful filter against cranks. '46 For
example, "the vast majority of suggestions which an uninformed person
might mistake for a contribution to science will, quite properly, not be
taken seriously and will not find their way to discussion or publica-
tion."47 As Williams notes, if everything were taken seriously, "science
would grind to a halt."
'4 8
Thus, we must accept that the norms of different disciplines clearly
do govern how professors live their lives and do their work. The "ideal-
ized market" of the academy cannot be described as either indiscrimi-
42. This structure is reflected in how Justice Harlan famously described the four essential
academic freedoms: "to determine who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught,
and who may be admitted to study." Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957).
The structure is reflected in scholarly literature. See, e.g., Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Constitu-
tional Rights of Private Governments, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 144, 186 (2003) (portraying universi-
ties as "private governments" that use their resources-and the threat of their denial-to co-
erce behavior).
43. Even the academic world invokes "marketplace" metaphors that divert attention from
the highly structured nature of the academic environment. See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae the
Thomas Jefferson Center for the Protection of Free Expression, et al., in support of the Re-
spondent at4, Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951 (2006) (No. 04-473) (AAUP joins in argu-
ing that the university is an "intellectual experiment station").
44. WILLIAMS, supra note 2 1, at 214. For further discussion of the importance of disci-
plinary consensus, see also KUHN, supra note 4; JASPERS, supra note 15; Edwards AAUP
Brief, supra note 27, at 19 ("a theory gains acceptance in science not through the power of its
adherents to persuade a legislature, but through its intrinsic ability to persuade the discipline at
large"). Cf Schauer, supra note 14, at 115-16 (art is not art unless and until it is accepted as
such by the proper arbiters). The importance of acceptance and consensus is linked to the
commitment to truth within academia. Lying or a failure of truth is incompatible with an aca-
demic discipline because lying attempts to persuade through power rather than through reason.
WILLIAMS, supra note 21, at 146-47.
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nately open or egalitarian. 49 Yet, the essentially conservative force of
the discipline within academia 50 is an extremely potent guard against ex-
ternal pressures. It is this paradox-that the inherently conservative insti-
tution of the discipline can be used to protect quite non-conservative
thought and behavior within academia-to which I now turn.
II. ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND THE DISCIPLINE
Conventional academic freedom debates feature neither the exis-
tence of the discipline nor its importance to faculty. Instead, they tend to
emphasize either free-standing individual liberty or university autonomy.
When debate focuses on a professor's individual liberty, it typically
devolves into arguments that a given professor has a free speech right to
say what he wants to say, to teach what he wants to teach, and to choose
his own research agenda. At its most extreme, the individual liberty per-
spective conjures up an academic world portrayed in satiric novels where
academic freedom and the tenure system are described as routinely pro-
tecting eccentric, even rogue, behavior of university faculty. These sa-
tiric portrayals completely miss the constraining-indeed, profoundly
conservative-nature of the disciplinary association. They convey no
sense of the possibility that when academic freedom is threatened, it is
because the integrity of a discipline, not only individual liberty, is at
risk. 51
The university autonomy perspective typically consists of a claim
for deference to the judgments made by universities about policy and
49. Cf Evelyn Brody, Entrance, Voice, and Exit: The Constitutional Bounds of the Right
of Association, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 821, 857-58 (2002) (noting that in some organizations
"voice power" is not egalitarian).
50. The conservative force of the discipline should not, however, be overstated. The dis-
cipline is not immune to change. See KUHN, supra note 4 (explaining how normal science
evolves and paradigm shifts occur). As Williams notes, there is-and must be-flexibility
within the discipline, so that "new questions can be asked." WILLIAMS, supra note 21, at 265.
For an argument that there may be more structure-and coercion-in academia than there
ought to be, see Jeffrey Williams, The Other Politics of Tenure, 26.3 COLLEGE LITERATURE
226 (1999) (highlighting how the discipline can constitute a professional monopoly that exer-
cises power through fear and abuse of the tenure process). Untenured faculty must pay atten-
tion to all sorts of pressures, from within the discipline and without. On the other hand, ten-
ured professors may more readily push disciplinary boundaries.
51. See William G. Tierney, Academic Freedom and Tenure: Between Fiction and Real-
ity, 75 J. HIGHER EDUC. 161 (2004). In these novels, the research-dependent tenure system
may be portrayed as permitting--or even prcssuring-professors to take unethical research
shortcuts or as making the teaching of students irrelevant. Indeed, the primary teacher-student
relationship may be portrayed as sexual. As Tiemey notes, some novelists do note the con-
straining influence. See, for example, the portrayal of the central character in John Kenneth
Galbraith's A Tenured Professor, described in Tierney, id. at 171 (quoting JOHN KENNETH
GALBRAITH, A TENURED PROFESSOR 38 (1990)).
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other matters,52 such as whom to admit as students 53 or whom to hire or
tenure as faculty members. 54 Justifications for university autonomy de-
rive, in part, from an assumption that the faculty, collectively, run uni-
versities; we are to believe that deference respects collective faculty gov-
ernance and, therefore, necessarily, faculty expertise and independence.
55
However, university decisions are not always driven by faculty expertise
or independence, or by academic or disciplinary values. 56 Universities
52. See, e.g., RONALD BARNET, THE IDEA OF HIGHER EDUCATION 136-146 (1990) (the
historic roots of academic freedom lie in institutional protection from coercion by other institu-
tions, not individual freedom). For recent scholarship dealing with deference to educational
institutions, see, e.g., Hills, supra note 42 (arguing that private, non-governmental institutions
like universities have a superior capacity to make good decisions); Paul Horwitz, Grutter's
First Amendment, 46 B.C. L. REV. 461, 472-81, 523-29 (2005) (arguing that universities
themselves are institutional rights-holders and are given deference to make ultimate determina-
tions about the balance to be struck between governmental interests and First Amendment val-
ues); John 0. McGinnis, Reviving Tocqueville 's America: The Rehnquist Court's Jurispru-
dence of Social Discovery, 90 CAL. L. REV. 485 (2002) (deference is an ideologically
appropriate adjunct to the Rehnquist Court's decentralization efforts); Wendy Parker, Connect-
ing the Dots: Grutter, School Desegregation, and Federalism, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1691,
1706-08 (2004) (discussing federalism and Brown v. Board of Education, where the Supreme
Court deferred to the expertise of local officials in finding effective ways to desegregate public
schools).
53. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (the University of Michigan defended
its use of race in the admissions process as a pedagogical choice to which courts should defer).
See also the White Center conference articles also appearing in this issue.
54. See George R. Kramer, Note, Title VII on Campus: Judicial Review of University
Employment Decisions, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1206 (1982).
55. See the basis for the argument in the Brief for Amicus Curiae The American Associa-
tion of University Professors in Support of Respondents, FAIR, 126 S. Ct. 1297 (2006) (No.
04-1152) [hereinafter FAIR AAUP Brief].
56. See supra text accompanying note 39. The institutional autonomy concept of aca-
demic freedom is in considerable tension with the individual faculty freedom concept. See,
e.g., Horwitz, supra note 52, at 477-78. For examples which pertain to efforts to provide
"balance" within universities, see Fish, supra note 37. According to Fish, university adminis-
trators try to provide "balance" as a way to satisfy critics of controversial opinions. To Fish,
[t]he idea is to inoculate the institution from criticism by multiplying the points of
view represented so that no one of them seems to be endorsed or valued.... [But
t]he academy flourishes when it takes ideas seriously; turning the occasion of a talk
on a particular topic or question into a pledge of allegiance to balance and... neu-
trality blunts the edge of any of the arguments that might be made and makes them
theatrical in the pejorative sense.... It may look like the protection of academic in-
quiry, but in fact it is the evacuation of academic inquiry.
Id. See also Joan Wallach Scott, Joan Wallach Scott on Threats to Academic Freedom,
ACADEME, Sept.-Oct. 2005, at 39, 40. Scott asks whether David Horowitz's academic bill of
rights, which turns on the idea of "balance," would require professors to give "creationism and
the denial of the Holocaust ... equal time in science and history courses .... [This would sus-
pend] the judgments of quality and the ethical commitments that are part of academic dis-
course." Id. Some university administrators, of course, share the views of Fish and Scott. See,
e.g., Lee C. Bollinger, The Value and Responsibilities of Academic Freedom, CHRON. HIGHER
EDUC., Apr. 8, 2005 (arguing that balance is not the answer), available at http://chronicle.com/
weekly/v51 /i31/31b0200 1 .htm.
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may be influenced by political and financial pressures that the discipline
itself eschews.57 The assumption that a university might always ade-
quately represent the interests of a discipline that transcends the univer-
sity is puzzling.
To get a sense of the role that the discipline might properly play in
the academic freedom debate, one must turn to Establishment Clause
litigation challenging creation-science or intelligent-design legislation.
Consider, for example, Edwards v. Aguillard,58 which involved a con-
troversy about the constitutionality of a Louisiana law known as the
"Balanced Treatment for Creation-Science and Evolution Science in
Public School Instruction." The law forbade the teaching of evolution
unless creation science was also taught. In their amicus brief, the Ameri-
can Association of University Professors ("AAUP") and the American
Council on Education ("ACE") expressed an interest in preventing a leg-
islative, creation-science mandate from impairing the "soundness of sci-
entific education." 59 The AAUP and ACE linked academic freedom not
only to an "individual teacher's freedom to teach, research, and pub-
lish,"'60 but also to "an even older wellspring.. . , the autonomy of the
institutions themselves and of the disciplinary groups within them."
61
The brief repeatedly referred to the disciplinary group, invoking the free-
dom of a community of scholars to determine what is or is not authentic
to their disciplines; 62 to hire faculty based on departmental assessments
of the scientific merit of subjects and candidates; 63 and to assess value,
57. The argument against FAIR's position in Morriss, supra note 12, which is based on a
description of law schools as commercial enterprises, is much more understandable if one ig-
nores the discipline. From Morriss' frame of reference, career services become a consumer
"good" furnished by the law school. The discipline is not, however, commercial in any re-
spect; from the perspective of the discipline, career services activities have to do with role ob-
ligations central to the discipline.
58. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987).
59. Edwards AAUP Brief, supra note 27, at 14 ("science and its boundaries must be de-
fined by the collaborative and competitive work of minds devoted to its study"). See also id.
at 6 (arguing that what is taught should be determined by scholarly discussion and consensus,
not by legislative fiat). That the work of science is done through processes that lead to consen-
sus within the discipline is the primary theme of the brief. The brief referenced disciplines
other than science. See id. at 10 n.4 (discussing the controversy within law regarding the
"critical legal studies" movement and the ultimate authority of law professors to judge its mer-
its). It should be noted that, in this brief, the educational institution is implicitly assumed to
stand for the discipline.
60. Id. at 12.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 5, 13.
63. The brief is concerned about how departmental hiring decisions might be affected by
the non-discrimination provisions of the Louisiana law, as hiring is an essential part of aca-
demic freedom and the "autonomy of institutions of higher learning to determine for them-
selves on professional grounds who may teach on their campuses." Id. at 5. The brief objects
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such as "what constitutes scholarly work worth doing, of what ap-
proaches in the subject matter are likely to be productive, even deep pre-
suppositions about the nature of the discipline... [which] it is the judg-
ment of the disciplinary body to make." 64 The brief referred (1) to the
possibility that a "department as a whole may have concluded, in the best
exercise of its professional judgment, [that scientific creationism] is un-
scientific," (2) to the possibility that an "overwhelming consensus of [a]
discipline" may find creation-science to be only religion, and (3) to the
fact that "[a] theory gains acceptance in science ... through its intrinsic
ability to persuade the discipline at large." 65 By dictating what counts as
a theory worthy of scientific attention, the statute would take time away
from other, more worthy matters.
66
Although the nature of a discipline and the threat to it posed by leg-
islative requirements to teach creationism as science are clearly de-
scribed in cases like Edwards v. Aguillard,67 the discipline does not get
similar treatment in the non-religious academic freedom cases. In Rums-
feld v. FAIR,68 for example, the academic freedom debate has unfolded
without giving prominence or clarity to the discipline.
69
The FAIR lawsuit challenged the validity of the federal Solomon
Amendment, which tells university recipients of federal funds that they,
and all of their "sub-elements," must give the military access to campus
placement services. 70 The Solomon Amendment has created consider-
to a statute that "adopt[s] an ideological litmus test that insulates an incumbent or a candidate
from disqualification on purely academic grounds." Id. at 11.
64. Id. at 8.
65. Id. at 10, 14.
66. Id. at 14-15, 17.
67. See also the extensive presentation of these points in Kitzmiller v. Dover Area School
Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707 (M.D. Pa. 2005). Readers interested in a summary of the arguments
and evidence in Kitzmiller might wish to consult Margaret Talbot, Darwin in the Dock, NEW
YORKER, Dec. 5, 2005, at 66.
68. FAIR, 126 S. Ct. 1297 (2006).
69. In this article, I cannot do justice to all of the excellent arguments made in FAIR,
which included Declarations filed by numerous law professors and individuals seeking to ex-
plain, in their own words, why the Solomon Amendment is a threat to them and to their inter-
ests. I particularly like the Declaration of Dean Richard Matasar, who comes close to offering
a cohesive disciplinary argument. My wish for a more fully developed disciplinary argument
should not be taken as a judgment that the case was poorly litigated. It was not. Most of the
documents filed in FAIR, including the Matasar Declaration, are available through Solomon-
Response.Org at www.law.georgetown.edu/solomon/documents/Matasar.pdf [hereinafter Ma-
tasar Declaration]. For another extended and institutional analysis of FAIR, see Horwitz, su-
pra note 52.
70. 10 U.S.C.A. § 983(b) (West. Supp. 2005) provides:
No funds described in subsection (d)(1) may be provided by contract or by grant to
an institution of higher education (including any subelement of such institution) if
the Secretary of Defense determines that that institution (or any subelement of that
institution) has a policy or practice (regardless of when implemented) that either
20061
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able difficulty for law schools and their parent institutions because law
schools typically do not extend the services of their placement offices to
prospective employers who discriminate on the basis of sexual orienta-
tion.
An employer like the military, which adheres to the "Don't Ask,
Don't Tell" policy regarding homosexuals, would ordinarily not be given
access to law school placement facilities. Nonetheless, for many years
law schools and the military found a way of informally reconciling the
mandate of the Solomon Amendment with law school non-discrimination
policies. Some law schools, for example, permitted military recruiters to
use part, but not all, of their placement services. Others arranged for the
military to conduct interviews outside law school premises. 71 No law
school, of course, ever told its graduates that they would not be permitted
to use their skills within the military.
These reconciling practices continued until some time in late 2001,
after which the Defense Department began interpreting the current ver-
sion of the Solomon Amendment to impose the significant sanction of a
cut-off of federal funds to any university with "sub-elements," such as
law schools, that denied full access to military recruiters. 72 Responding
to this pressure, law schools around the country effectively suspended
their non-discrimination policies for military recruiters. 73 In relatively
short order, a group of individuals and entities challenged the constitu-
tionality of the Solomon Amendment claiming, in part, that the Amend-
prohibits, or in effect prevents--(1) the Secretary of a military department or Secre-
tary of Homeland Security from gaining access to campuses, or access to students
(who are 17 years of age or older) on campuses, for purposes of military recruiting
in a manner that is at least equal in quality and scope to the access to campuses and
to students that is provided to any other employer.
71. See Brief for the Respondents at 7-8, FAIR, 126 S. Ct. 1297 (2006) (No. 04-1152)
[hereinafter FAIR Respondents' Brief] (providing examples of law school accommodation).
See also Brief for the Association of American Law Schools as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Respondents at 13-14, FAIR, 126 S. Ct. 1297 (2006) (No. 04-1152) [hereinafter FAIR AALS
Brief] (affording an excellent source of information about the Solomon Amendment; the his-
tory of non-discrimination policies in law schools, especially the policy regarding sexual ori-
entation; and the ameliorative efforts and compromises taken by some law schools).
72. The Department of Defense took the position that federal funds would be cut off
unless schools treated military recruiters exactly the same as other employers. FAIR Respon-
dents' Brief, supra note 71, at 10-11.
73. The difficulty was faced by the parent institutions of law schools, which would suffer
from a cut-off of funds if a law school defied the Solomon Amendment. The potential mone-
tary penalties for universities are substantial. Id. at 6 (estimating the hundreds of millions of
dollars that several institutions stand to lose by a cut-off of federal funds). As the FAIR AAUP
Brief, supra note 55, at 25, pointed out, law schools themselves receive almost no funds from




ment infringes on academic freedom. The lead plaintiff was the Forum
for Academic and Institutional Rights.
74
One would expect the discipline of law to feature prominently in the
FAIR litigation. After all, the academic freedom interests of those asso-
ciated with a single discipline-law-are said to be at stake. The case,
FAIR argued, was about the jealously-guarded autonomy of law schools,
which, although part of the larger university, are not in a "command-and-
control" relationship within the university.75 FAIR posited that the Solo-
mon Amendment threatens the "nature" of law, and that the integrity of
law will be compromised if law schools become a tool of orthodoxy.
76 It
made the unexceptionable point that the integrity of a collective enter-
prise will be compromised if a law school announces that it stands for a
principle to which it fails to adhere in practice because of the Solomon
Amendment mandates. 77 From the very earliest stages of litigation,
FAIR-like any defender of a discipline's ways of behaving and being in
relation to a particular subject matter-referenced core values that the
plaintiffs wished to inculcate in law students. 78 However, there was no
comprehensive or developed disciplinary-based argument for academic
freedom in FAIR that would show why values or interests essential to the
very identity of law are at risk if law schools are forced to give the mili-
tary full and unqualified cooperation in the recruitment of law gradu-
ates.79 Individuals or institutions of a very different nature can interact
74. FAIR had a membership of miscellaneous law schools and faculty members who, by
majority vote at their institutions, agreed to join the litigation. Second Amended Complaint,
FAIR, 126 S. Ct. 1297, (No. 04 Civ. 4433), available at http://www.law.georgetown.edu/
solomon/FAIRvRumsfeld.html [hereinafter FAIR Second Amended Complaint].
75. See Declaration of E. Joshua Rosenkranz in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to
Dismiss Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint at 2, FAIR, 126 S. Ct. 1297 (No. 03 Civ.
4422), http://www.law.georgetown.edu/solomon/documents/Rosenkranz.pdf.
76. FAIR Respondents' Brief, supra note 71, at 20 (an organization needs to be true to its
own nature).
77. Id. at 28-29.
78. See infra text accompanying notes 103-05 for a discussion of the values of equality
and justice.
79. A few of FAIR's allies attempted to highlight the discipline. For example, the pri-
mary thrust of the FAIR AAUP Brief, supra note 55, at 9, was that the academy selects and
monitors everything that goes on in it so as to ensure that its values are not undermined and
can be effectively imparted to students. The AAUP reminded the Court that, although the
government may not impose a "strait-jacket" or "orthodoxy" on the university, a university
itself operates according to a set of constraining values. Id. at 10. It asked for protection for
the associated, collective, and expressive effort of law faculty to transmit its chosen values. Id.
at 19. It did not, however, focus on values unique to the discipline of law. The expertise of
the AAUP is in articulating general principles of academic freedom, and its brief stuck to those
principles. In a section entitled "Core Areas of Academic Policy and Expertise," id. at 8-15, it
identified and discussed activities-for example, faculty governance, structuring the proper
educational setting, establishing criteria for grading and rewarding students, selecting appro-
priate extramural activities, and teaching through a variety of methods-protected by academic
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without losing their essential identity or integrity. FAIR needed to iden-
tify those things that must be protected and shielded from interference, at
all costs, in order for the law to retain its identity and integrity.
80
Instead, FAIR-understandably, from a free-speech, academic free-
dom perspective-focused on a specific message. 8 1 It argued that law
schools must retain the ability to send a message of non-discrimination.
82
A non-discrimination message is certainly a worthy goal (and when seen
from a simple free-speech standpoint might be constitutionally pro-
tected), but it is not clear that the specific message that condemns sexual
orientation discrimination is part and parcel of, or essential to, the disci-
pline of law. The proper scope of non-discrimination principles is a sub-
ject of much debate. What types of discrimination are invidious? What,
on occasion, justifies even invidious discrimination? The issue certainly
"counts" within the discipline, but should we conclude that non-
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is a substantive precept,
inextricably bound up with the identity of law? We need to know more
before we will be persuaded to conclude that a law school's or a law pro-
fessor's specific non-discrimination message is integral to the discipline
of law.
FAIR also invoked the idea that the "hallmark of the academy" is
"free and open discourse." 83 The argument for an open, pedagogical en-
freedom, but it did not explicate how law as a unique discipline would be adversely affected
by intrusion into these matters. Cf Edwards AAUP Brief, discussed at notes 59-66, supra,
and in the accompanying text.
80. The failure of FAIR in this respect came through clearly in the Supreme Court's deci-
sion. As the Court described the impact of the Solomon Amendment on the plaintiff, it saw
law schools as only "interact[ing]" with military recruiters. FAIR, 126 S. Ct. 1297, 1312
(2006). Recruiters are "mere[ly] presen[t]," id. at 1313, "outsiders," id. at 1312, who have no
intention of trying to become a member of any association. See also the description of the im-
pact of the Solomon Amendment in Morriss, supra note 12. According to Morriss, govern-
ment already has a rather significant presence in career services programs, id. at 430; faculty
do not have an interest in a career services office, id. at 456; and law schools are concerned
only with the "small potatoes" issue of minimizing military access to career services, id. at
469.
81. References to different messages pervaded the briefs of FAIR and its allies. See, e.g.,
FAIR AAUP Brief, supra note 55, at 19; FAIR AALS Brief, supra note 71, at 17 et seq. (the
associational rights argument emphasizes that law faculties are engaged in an expressive activ-
ity-the transmission of values-through a collective effort). See also FAIR AAUP Brief, su-
pra note 55, at 4; FAIR AALS Brief, supra note 71, at 14; Transcript of Supreme Court Oral
Argument, FAIR, 126 S. Ct. 1297 (No. 04-1152) [hereinafter Transcript of Oral Argument]
(arguing that the current version of the Solomon Amendment was adopted precisely in re-
sponse to efforts of law schools to express disagreement with the military's policy); Brief
Amici Curiae of the American Civil Liberties Union et al. in Support of Respondents, FAIR,
126 S. Ct. 1297 (No. 04-1152) (sticking with a straightforward speech analysis).
82. FAIR Respondents' Brief, supra note 71, at 34.
83. See, e.g., id. at 3-4 (emphasizing that the non-discrimination policy is needed to en-
sure an open debate about all topics); FAIR AALS Brief, supra note 71, at 2-3 (discussing the
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vironment is important, especially for free-speech doctrine, but it is not a
disciplinary argument. Indeed, what defines a discipline are its con-
straints on methods and norms of inquiry. Moreover, with respect to this
value, nothing in the military's recruitment practices bans a debate-on
academic terms satisfactory to the law school world--of the legitimacy
or wisdom of military policy. 84 Thus, FAIR could not argue convinc-
ingly that the specific external intrusion represented by military on-
campus recruiting would put the discipline at risk.
85
FAIR also argued that the Solomon Amendment is incompatible
with the principle that people are to be judged on the merit of their ideas
and not on extraneous matters. 86 Merit defined in these terms is cer-
tainly a norm that informs the work done within the academic world.
87
The military is not the academy, though, and there are a variety of quali-
importance of free expression from persons with a variety of view-points and personal experi-
ences).
84. This obvious rebuttal to FAIR's argument was not neglected by defenders of the
Solomon Amendment. See, e.g., Brief of Center of Individual Rights et al. as Amici Curiae in
Support of Petitioners and in Support of Reversal, FAIR, 126 S. Ct. 1297 (No. 04-1152) [here-
inafter FAIR Center for Individual Rights Brief]; Brief for the Petitioners at 21, FAIR, 126 S.
Ct. 1297 (No. 04-1152) (no one could possibly believe that law schools advocate discrimina-
tion simply because they permit the military to use their placement services) [hereinafter FAIR
Petitioners' Brief]. See also the district court's reaction to FAIR's argument, FAIR v. Rums-
feld, 291 F. Supp. 2d 269, 303 (D.N.J. 2003) (the Solomon Amendment leaves professors "free
to speak and teach as they please," and "it does not interfere with academic discourse by con-
demning or silencing a particular ideology or point of view").
85. One might have given the argument a truly disciplinary cast by linking it to discipli-
nary standards. Each discipline has its own laboratory within which the pursuit of truth is
conducted, and each sanctions certain methods of inquiry and the relevance of certain types of
data. Law, as a discipline, relies heavily on the adversarial laboratory of the common law and
on individuals as a source of information and understanding. Law schools might, therefore, be
concerned about any policy or practice that would undermine the ability of students to work
with such sources of information in the academy. Although the topic of sexual orientation is
no longer effectively verboten within law schools, the need for information-and critical de-
bate-about sexual orientation is as strong as it ever was. Gay law students need to be willing
to speak up without fear of penalty, as well as other students who might, for example, fear re-
percussions from being viewed as homosexual if they advocate for gay rights. Thus, from a
disciplinary perspective, a non-discrimination policy protecting all students from potential em-
ployment penalties is arguably critical. See FAIR AALS Brief, supra note 71, at 5-6 (noting
that once Yale adopted its non-discrimination policy in 1978, it became a center for thinking
about issues of sexual orientation). See Declaration of Erwin Chemerinsky, FAIR, 126 S. Ct.
1297 (No. 03 Civ. 4422), http://www.law.georgetown.edu/solomon/
documents/Chemerinsky.pdf (regarding the requirement of critique in law) [hereinafter
Chemerinsky Declaration].
86. See, e.g., FAIR Respondents' Brief, supra note 71, at 1.
87. See FAIR AAUP Brief, supra note 55, at 3-4, 9-12 (discussing the interest in reward-
ing all students with respect to merit in their opportunities for employment). The AAUP ar-
gued that a core value at stake in FAIR is preserving merit-based judgments, a value that ex-
tends throughout the university, id. at 1, and explains why a university might wish to ensure
that career opportunities, as well as grades, are made available to students solely on the basis
of merit. Id. at 9.
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fications that the military says are important to it and its job openings. In
this respect, the military is like a lot of employers. Workplace merit is
not assessed with reference simply to the quality of ideas, but also, for
example, with respect to how a job candidate presents himself in an in-
terview, or whether the candidate seems to be a team player. It is surely
problematic to assume that the "merit" that affects career opportunities
is-or ought to be-the same "merit" reflected in the assignment of
grades. Further, there is no reason necessarily to assume that the activity
of recruiting with reference to the military's employment criteria will
undermine the criteria used to assess merit in the entirely separate, aca-
demic world of the law school.
Other arguments made by FAIR could be interpreted to cut against a
disciplinary focus. For example, FAIR placed in the judicial record
many individual declarations that emphasized individual choice rather
than affiliations with the discipline. 88 Specific law schools were said to
have adopted non-discrimination policies because of their unique histori-
cal traditions,89 and specific professors were said to have chosen to teach
at specific law schools because they agreed with the school's non-
discrimination policies. 90 These references to "choice," standing alone
and without reference to the discipline, provide fodder for persons who
would see any non-discrimination policy as a product of a decision to be
liberal or pacifist or a product of mere "starry-eyed idealism" 91 rather
than an inherent and necessary value of the discipline. They also pro-
vided no justification for rejecting competing arguments of defenders of
the Solomon Amendment who claimed to represent academic freedom
interests as well.9
2
88. Examples of these declarations can be found through SolomonResponse.Org at
http://www.law.georgetown.edu/solomon/FAIRvRumsefeld.html (last visited Sept. 7, 2006).
89. See, e.g., Matasar Declaration, supra note 69, at 5-7, 9, 11 (suggesting that NYU has
chosen to link law and justice in a particular way and that specific law schools have a right to
choose their mission).
90. See, e.g., Chemerinsky Declaration, supra note 85, at 5. See also the allegations of the
Society of American Law Teachers (SALT), whose membership consists of individual profes-
sors who want to foster a respectful, open dialogue on fundamental questions of law and jus-
tice. FAIR Second Amended Complaint, supra note 74.
91. FAIR AAUP Brief, supra note 55, at 3 (quoting 140 Cong. Rec. H3863 (daily ed.
May 23, 1994) (Rep. Pombo)).
92. Other law professors and students contested the way in which the FAIR plaintiffs de-
scribed academic freedom interests. For example, the FAIR Center for Individual Rights Brief,
supra note 84, at 1, 11, represented the interests of students against the "politically correct"
views of university faculty and administration that military recruiters should not be allowed
the same access to law school placement services as other prospective employers. Students,
the Center argued, are the "primary beneficiaries of academic freedom." Id. at 4, 12. They
have a "right to listen" to the military's message. Id. at 8. Administrators are merely fiduciar-
ies of the students' right. Id. at 12. The Center argued that academic freedom will not be
served by university regulations that preserve the kind of environment and limited "market"
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The umbrella of the discipline-within which choice assumes a par-
ticular significance-might give us some help in sorting through multiple
and contested ways of characterizing or claiming legitimacy for aca-
demic freedom interests. It would certainly help us understand how, if at
all, various claims are related to the integrity of law as a discipline. Yet
the discipline had only a tenuous toehold, at best, in FAIR. One can dis-
cern threads for a promising disciplinary argument in disparate portions
of the FAIR briefs, 93 but these threads were not woven together. The
discipline, its patterns and integrity, remained a shadowy figure.
III. A PROPOSAL FOR A DISCIPLINE-BASED ACADEMIC FREEDOM
ARGUMENT
A cohesive disciplinary argument in the context of the FAIR contro-
versy would be twofold.94 First, it would describe the structure of law as
a discipline, in which a variety of disciplinary affiliates pursue a truthful
understanding of law and its practice within disciplinary constraints and
expect that, out of their disparate work, a disciplinary consensus will
arise. Second, it would explain how the essential integrity of this disci-
plinary work is threatened by the Solomon Amendment.
Consider first the structure of the discipline of law. Paradoxically,
the strength of a discipline-based academic freedom argument will be
deemed appropriate by the university but, rather, by a marketplace of ideas completely free of
any authoritative regulation. Id. at 9-10. It argued that deference should not be accorded to
the judgment of university administrators but, rather, to the judgment of the legislators who
passed the Solomon Amendment. Id. at 29. Other amicus briefs are listed at
www.supremecourtus.gov/docket/04-1152.htm.
93. Perhaps this is by design. It is not an unusual Supreme Court strategy to enlist differ-
ent amici to present different facets of an argument. Typically, though, there will be one place
where one can find the overarching story. See, e.g., Paul M. Collins, Jr., Friends of the Court:
Examining the Influence of Amicus Curiae Participation in US. Supreme Court Litigation, 38
LAW & SOC'Y REv. 809 (2004); Thomas G. Hansford, Information Provision, Organizational
Constraints, and the Decision to Submit an Amicus Curiae Brief in a U.S. Supreme Court
Case, 57 POL. RES. Q. 219 (2004); Kelly J. Lynch, Best Friends? Supreme Court Law Clerks
on Effective Amicus Curiae Briefs, 20 J. L. & POL. 33 (2004).
94. This article presents only one disciplinary take on the Solomon Amendment debate.
There might be others. One might, for example, wish to argue that the military's "Don't Ask,
Don't Tell" policy weakens the discipline of law because it excludes the talents and energies
of homosexuals without regard to whether they have important contributions to make to the
discipline and development of law. By resisting military recruitment under this policy, law
schools hope to pressure the military to change its ways, but the Solomon Amendment inter-
feres with the ability of law schools to exert this pressure. FAIR's arguments might easily take
this direction. See, e.g., Matasar Declaration, supra note 69, at 8, 11 (asserting that, although
the military's "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy is legal, it is "wrong as applied to the hiring of
lawyers... [for] invidious discrimination within the profession weakens the institution that is
charged with preserving government of, for and by the people").
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enhanced by reminders that the discipline of law transcends any given
university or, indeed, the academy in general.
Law, as a discipline, exists because of the collective efforts and con-
tributions of many disciplinary affiliates: practicing attorneys, judges act-
ing through courts, law professors acting through law schools, and other
professional organizations. It is inhabited by a variety of persons playing
different roles but dedicated to a common practice: realizing the rule of
law. 95 In other words, the discipline of law is not merely academic.
From a disciplinary perspective, there is no gap between the academic
study and the practice of law.96 There is simply dialogue and interaction
among people committed to living within the same normative commu-
nity. Scholars in the discipline of law must pay attention to all of the
contexts in which law is practiced. 97 The academic manifestations and
products of life within the discipline of law, such as footnoted law re-
view articles, may not look like the manifestations and products of disci-
plinary life outside the university, such as an argumentative brief, but all
disciplinary affiliates, within a university and without, "do" law in ac-
cordance with the norms of the discipline and its consensus about what
"counts" as an important question. What goes on in law schools is sig-
nificantly dependent on how law is practiced and how substantive law
develops and evolves in law offices and in the courts. Ethical precepts
that govern the practice of law are also ever-present in legal education,
98
95. Post, supra note 14, at 616, 618, 622. See also supra note 4 (sources citing the nature
of interpretive communities); Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, The New Imperialism: Violence,
Norms, and the "Rule of Law, " 101 MICH. L. REV. 2275 (2003) (discussing the way in which
rule-of-law concepts are formed); Kristin Booth Glen, The Law School In and As Community,
35 U. TOL. L. REV. 63, 67 (2003) (discussing the community of affinity that is law).
96. See, e.g., Symposium, Law, Knowledge, and the Academy, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1278
(2002) (the discipline and the profession are used as interchangeable terms). With respect to
the school and the practice, see Byrne, supra note 14, at 328-29 (describing the connections
between the academy and the practice of law, especially with respect to professional obliga-
tions), and AN EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON LAW SCHOOLS
AND THE PROFESSION: NARROWING THE GAP (Am. Bar Ass'n Section of Legal Educ. and
Admissions to the Bar, ed., 1992) [hereinafter The MacCrate Report]. But see Post, supra note
14, at 618 (those who inhabit the institution of law have traditionally shared common practices
and argumentative methods, but-tempted by other disciplinary forces within the academy-
perhaps do not still agree that the ultimate purpose of legal scholarship is to assist in the reali-
zation of the rule of law).
97. Rhode, supra note 14, at 1330. See also Glen, supra note 95, at 67 ("The profes-
sional community is important to law schools and vice versa.").
98. The FAIR Respondents' Brief, supra note 71, at 9, 13, for example, argued that as
non-discrimination has become an essential value of the profession and is reflected in codes of
professional conduct, law schools have moved to inculcate the professional norm in their stu-




affecting even teaching styles. 99 Even the ongoing debate about the rela-
tive weight law schools should give to how law works in the real world
versus policy-oriented aspirations for change confirms the disciplinary
understanding that anyone "doing" law must take both into account. 100
Moreover, within the disciplinary community whose consensus dic-
tates what "counts," the contributions of each affiliate are important. As
James Boyd White reminds us, legal knowledge is "constantly created
and recreated[] differently by different minds on different occasions" out
of disagreement on key issues. 0 1 No subgroup of affiliates controls the
discipline-not law schools, law professors, the Association of American
Law Schools, attorneys, or judges. Even the Supreme Court of the
United States does not pretend to enjoy a monopoly within the discipline.
Indeed, the Court has protected practitioners of law from state efforts to
exert a monopoly over the way law will be developed within the disci-
pline. It has invalidated state regulations that might have limited the
ability of attorneys to consult about appropriate strategies of legal repre-
sentation or the ability of attorneys to represent groups as they see fit.
10 2
In other words, the Court has refused to disable practicing attorneys as
full participants in the project of "doing" and forming a disciplinary con-
sensus about law. The Court has kept disciplinary dialogue open to all
ideas and questions that "count" within the discipline, most recently in
the context of political gerrymandering claims. 
103
99. See FAIR AAUP Brief, supra note 55, at 3-4 (stressing how important modeling is,
as a method of teaching, in a professional school); FAIR AALS Brief, supra note 71, at 20 (re-
garding the connection between classroom teaching and other things that happen in the law
school). See also Emily M. Calhoun, The Professional Schools: The Influence of a Profes-
sional Ethic on Teacher Styles, in ON TEACHING 77, 84 (Mary Ann Shea, ed., 1987) (describ-
ing how teachers model ethical precepts associated with the practice of law in their teaching
for the Faculty Teaching Excellence Program at the University of Colorado at Boulder).
100. For a review of different types of scholarship that compete within the academy, see
Rhode, supra note 14 (discussing, for example, doctrinal, empirical, and theoretical scholar-
ship).
101. White, supra note 4, at 1400 (disagreement is where debate occurs); id. at 1401 (the
creation of legal knowledge).
102. See, e.g., In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978) (protecting associational, litigation activ-
ity); United Mine Workers v. I11. State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217 (1967) (although states have
broad power to regulate the profession, they cannot impair associational freedoms, even if they
relate to litigation that is not about political matters of acute social comment); Bd. of R.R.
Trainmen v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 1 (1964) (protecting the right of individuals to consult within
an organization, to select their own spokesperson to give legal advice); NAACP v. Button, 371
U.S. 415, 431 (1963) (associations for litigation may be the most effective form of political
association, especially for minority groups).
103. The Court refused to absolutely close debate on political gerrymandering claims, in
Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004), despite Justice Scalia's complaint that an eighteen-
year failure to identify proper standards for evaluating these claims ought to result in a deci-
sion to shut off dialogue within the courts.
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Within law, one of the most significant questions is each discipli-
nary affiliate's role obligations. There is a consensus that disciplinary af-
filiates should pay attention to role obligations. There is also a consen-
sus that the elusive but central concepts of "equality" and "justice," to
which FAIR and its allies frequently referred, bear on the proper dis-
charge of role obligations. Although a comprehensive discussion of
these concepts is beyond the scope of this Article, it is generally accepted
that equality and justice are central to role obligations, in part, because
lawyers enjoy an unusual position of largely self-regulated power1°4 and,
in part, because their work is integral to securing the rule of law and en-
suring that "discrete and insular minorities" are protected against the tyr-
anny of pure majority rule. 10 5 Nevertheless, disciplinary agreement on
these two matters-that affiliates must pay attention to role obligations
with reference to principles of equality and justice-does not entail a
consensus on the proper fulfillment of obligations. 106
In particular, there is especially no consensus on how an affiliate
should fulfill role obligations when asked to practice or "do" law in a
normatively different-and from the perspective of the discipline, argua-
bly degraded-system of law. Consider, for example, the different per-
spectives on role obligations reflected in Paul Finkelman's account of the
104. Indeed, attorneys are actually relieved of personal responsibility for some conse-
quences of conduct that would be seen as immoral or reprehensible if attributed to a non-
professional. An attorney, for example, can successfully defend an accused murderer without
needing to accept personal responsibility for the fact that a culpable person might escape pun-
ishment. Richard Wasserstrom, Lawyers As Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 HUM. RTS.
1, 3-6 (1975).
105. The Matasar Declaration, supra note 69, does a good job of explaining the ethical
mindset associated with this role. Dean Matasar explained that non-discrimination is "of the
greatest importance [to law] because of the central role the American legal profession plays in
the functioning of American democracy, which rests on the rule of law, and at the heart of
which is the constitutionally guaranteed promise of equal protection of the laws." Id. at 7. The
district court in Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc. v. Rumsfeld, 291 F. Supp.
2d 269, 280 (D.N.J. 2003), picked up on the idea of the rule of law, characterizing it-and its
equality corollary-as essential to the law school mission.
106. In FAIR, 126 S. Ct. 1297 (2006), the plaintiffs repeatedly emphasized equality and
justice and undertook a difficult effort to persuade the Court that there is agreement on the
meaning of these substantive principles. See supra notes 78-101 and accompanying text.
There is no doubt that the discipline is concerned with these values. See, e.g., The MacCrate
Report, supra note 96, at 4 (the discipline should strive to promote justice and fairness, to treat
othcrs with dignity, and to enhance the capacity of law to do justice). But there is no agree-
ment on precisely what these concepts mean. The constitutional story of equality is ongoing
and evolving. See, e.g., Robert M. Cover, The Origins of Judicial Activism in the Protection of
Minorities, 91 YALE L.J. 1287 (1982). This article rests only on disciplinary agreement that
affiliates must grapple with the complexities of their role obligations given the evolving and
competing ways of thinking about justice and equality.
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rendition of Anthony Bums, a slave, by Judge Edward Loring. 107 Loring
was appointed to serve as a commissioner in slave rendition hearings
conducted under the federal Fugitive Slave Law, which prescribed a pro-
cedure that most of us would agree did not satisfy due process. The un-
fortunate Loring was thus required to find a way to "balance the demands
of the Fugitive Slave Law with the demands of law."
108
Loring's way of dealing with his role obligations was deemed unsat-
isfactory to some contemporaries and disciplinary affiliates of the twen-
tieth century and satisfactory to others. 10 9 For example, Loring appar-
ently chose to emphasize "his... responsibility as a professional
evaluator of proof."110 He limited his role to that of "providing ... the
statutory protection of verifying identity, making certain that the right
person was being taken out of state, cruel as this fate was."111
For the purpose of understanding the discipline-based argument that
might be made in FAIR, the validity of Loring's choice is not the point.
The point is that the discipline agrees that its affiliates should pay close
attention to their role obligations. Disciplinary affiliates should attempt
to find proper ways of "preserv[ing] some kind of autonomy for one's
clients, even with degraded systems of law." 112 They should attempt to
construct a proper "hermeneutic of resistance" that will ensure that law-
yers do not fall victim to "the proclivity [to] ... [become] ensnared
within the technical trappings of the law [of bad legal systems '1 13
They should be wary of the perverse effects that can arise from efforts to
find a way of negotiating the sometimes conflicting demands of law and
a specific statutory command. 114 By virtue of a disciplinary consensus,
questions pertaining to role obligations "count," and the questions
"count" significantly. 115
107. Paul Finkelman, Legal Ethics and Fugitive Slaves: The Anthony Burns Case, Judge
Loring, and Abolitionist Attorneys, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 1793 (1996).
108. Id. at 1812.
109. Judge Loring, for example, lost his position at Harvard Law. Finkelman says that
"[s]ome people interested in legal education wondered if a fugitive slave Commissioner-a
man who would enforce such a blatantly unfair law-was fit to teach future lawyers." Id. at
1834. Yet the Harvard Law faculty supported Loring. As the symposium illustrates, Loring's
story is complex, and different persons might draw a number of different lessons from it.
110. Ruth Wedgwood, Ethics Under Slavery's Constitution: Edward Loring and William
Wetmore Story, 17 CARDOzO L. REV. 1865, 1867 (1996).
111. Id. at 1868.
112. Sanford Levinson, Allocating Honor and Acting Honorably: Some Reflections Pro-
voked by the Cardozo Conference on Slavery, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 1969, 1978 (1996).
113. Owen M. Fiss, Can a Lawyer Ever Do Right?, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 1859 (1996).
114. Finkelman, supra note 107, at 1820 (discussing Loring's attempts to reach a "happy
result for all" concerned in the rendition).
115. In exchange for the special position which an attorney enjoys, she is under an obliga-
tion "to test, continually, the legitimacy of the ethic that relieves her" of ordinary moral con-
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These features of the discipline of law are the foundation of an ar-
gument that the Solomon Amendment constitutes a threat to the disci-
pline.
The integrity of the discipline is most obviously put at risk simply
because the Solomon Amendment interferes with decisions of key disci-
plinary affiliates-law schools and law professors-about how to think
about and truthfully address an issue that "counts" to the discipline. The
issue, in the context of the FAIR dispute and the military's "Don't Ask,
Don't Tell" policy, has to do with equality, justice, and role obligations.
Direct interference with a key disciplinary affiliate's effort to address this
issue-as that affiliate sees it-undermines the structural integrity of the
discipline. The discipline, by definition, consists of a consensus formed
over time out of the evolving, aggregate activities of affiliates beholden
only to the dictates of the discipline. The disciplinary argument is not
about protecting a particular disciplinary affiliate's message because of
the worth of the message per se; it is about protecting the discipline's
process of reaching a true consensus on an issue central to the integrity
of the discipline. 1
6
The Solomon Amendment poses a less obvious threat to the disci-
pline of law because it is not directed solely at law schools and law pro-
fessors. Its ultimate aim is to ensure that the military is able to freely re-
cruit law graduates to "do" law in a "Don't Ask, Don't Tell"
environment in which they might find it difficult to satisfactorily fulfill
disciplinary role obligations related to equality and justice. It asks law
schools, through their career services policies, to act as if "doing" law
within the military's "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" environment presents no
special difficulties. The Solomon Amendment thus creates a situation in
which law graduates may feel free to disregard or compromise the norms
of the discipline that has accredited them. Over time, "doing" law in this
way may alter what law is seen to be. 117 This is no less a threat to the
siderations. Calhoun, supra note 99, at 84. See Byrne, supra note 14, at 326; White, supra
note 5, at 1402 (emphasizing how important it is to pay attention to how the law is used be-
cause "law is capable of great evil").
116. See Levinson, supra note 112, at 1974 (discussing the criteria for deciding whom to
honor as lawyers, even John Marshall despite his decision in The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10
Wheat.) 66 (1825)). One can ask the question in terms of outcomes-who gets to be hon-
ored--or in terms of "precisely who gets to say whether he deserves the honor or not." Id. at
1974. To Levinson, the latter is the "far more interesting, and important" question. Id.
117. See, e.g., Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Essay, What Is Really Wrong With Compelled
Association, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 839, 855-57 (2005) (presenting studies that confirm that one's
thinking about a topic will be affected if one is compelled to say or practice something regu-
larly). The FAIR AAUP Brief, supra note 55, at 9, emphasized that the academy selects and
monitors everything that goes on in it so as to ensure that its values are not undermined. See
also Daubert AAAS Brief, supra note 27, at 1, 2-3, 5-6, 9 ("[s]cientists have an interest in
assuring that the fruits of their labors are understood and properly used by others [including
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integrity of the discipline of law than would be the threat posed should
practitioners of "magic" accredited by Hogwarts decide to ignore their
disciplinary responsibilities. Professor Dumbledore surely would refuse
Lord Voldemort permission to freely recruit Hogwarts students to use
their knowledge and skills in furtherance of the "dark arts." Let me be
clear about this less obvious threat of the Solomon Amendment.
First, the disciplinary concern is not with recruitment per se: it is
about recruitment to practice law in a problematic environment. 118 Nor
is the concern only that an individual member of any given profession
might find herself seriously at odds with and harmed by an employer's
demands. Nor is the disciplinary concern that important affiliates like
law schools should not be required to aid and abet a policy that they con-
sider immoral in the abstract. The concern is that, under some circum-
stances, if a discipline accredits graduates to "do" law, and then aids or
encourages them to do it in an environment in which the norms of the
discipline cannot be satisfied, the discipline itself risks being undermined
and corrupted. If the risk is realized, the harm to the discipline will be
significant. 119
Second, the disciplinary approach to the Solomon Amendment does
not accuse the military of being the equivalent of the evil Lord Volde-
mort or of having an immoral policy. It does not reflect disrespect for
the military. The disciplinary concern is self-referential and, if judg-
courts] in society," and wish courts to be rigorous in responding to offers of claimed scientific
evidence).
118. During this Conference, there was some discussion about whether career placement
services are germane to the academic mission. Cf, Chen, supra note 6 (discussing the general
concept of germaneness as it relates to First Amendment guarantees). It is difficult to argue
that career services functions are germane to a university, but it is not difficult to argue that the
conditions under which a university provides career services can be quite important to the in-
tegrity of a discipline that transcends the university.
119. For one reason or another, perhaps because of the recurring confrontations between
science and religion, see generally Kitzmiller v. Dover Area School District, 379 F. Supp. 2d
680 (M.D. Pa. 2005), I suspect that most of us understand the signature traits-the methods
and ethical stance-that give the sciences their disciplinary integrity. Because of that under-
standing, we would understand why a science department might resist-as a threat to the in-
tegrity of the discipline-permitting a creation-science institute to participate in a science de-
partment employment service for graduating students. Extending the argument, we would
equally understand, given the medical profession's disciplinary commitment to "first do no
harm," how a government mandate requiring medical schools to affirmatively aid military re-
cruiters to enlist medical students into the military for the purpose of facilitating effective tor-
ture sessions might threaten the integrity of the medical discipline. Older readers will perhaps
recall the court-martial of Dr. Howard B. Levy, a dermatologist who was assigned to train
Special Forces personnel at Fort Jackson, during the Viet Nam War. Levy refused to do so,
citing the ethics of the medical profession and his opinion that those enlisted in the Special
Forces were, among other things, murderers of women and children. See Robert N. Strassfeld,
The VietNam War on Trial: The Court-Martial of Dr. Howard B. Levy, 1994 WiS. L. REV. 839
(1994). See also infra text accompanying notes 122-27.
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mental about any entity, focuses on its own institutional character. The
differences that exist between the normative world of the military and the
world of law are a point of reference for thinking about the integrity of
the discipline, not the integrity of the military.
We cannot deny that there are differences between the military on
the one hand and civilian law and society on the other. 120 Because of
these differences, some professional activities undertaken within the
military-a quite distinctive normative community-might generate dif-
ficulties for persons credentialed to "do" law. The norms of the disci-
pline of law may generally be in tension with a military or executive
branch that wishes to ignore separation of powers principles, the tradi-
tions of the writ of habeas corpus, or the principle that an individual is
presumed innocent until proven guilty. 121
The disciplinary consensus about role obligations has special impor-
tance for attorneys practicing in a military environment for, unlike Judge
Loring, military attorneys cannot just walk away from a task in conflict
with disciplinary norms. Military attorneys are in the military. To see the
potential problem, take note of the Supreme Court decision in Parker v.
Levy. 122 In that case, the Court upheld the court-martial of a physician
who tried to walk away from an order to give medical training to Special
Forces members. Levy's defense was, in part, that physicians were
bound by a commitment to "first do no harm" and that Special Forces
personnel might use medical training for improper purposes. 123 The
Court reasoned, however, that military society is "a society apart from
civilian society," 124 just as "military law ... is a jurisprudence which ex-
ists separate and apart from the law which governs in our federal judicial
establishment." 125 Military customs and usages and norms of conduct
"are not measurable by our innate sense of right and wrong, of honor and
dishonor, but must be gauged by an actual knowledge and experience of
military life, its usages and duties." 126 There is simply not the same
120. See, e.g., Jonathan Turley, Tribunals and Tribulations: The Antithetical Elements of
Military Governance in a Madisonian Democracy, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 649 (2002).
121. More concretely, for example, the tension between the norms of the discipline of law
and those of the military community are currently being played out in the debate arising out of
restrictions put on attorneys defending enemy combatants before military commissions. See
Mary M. Cheh, Should Lawyers Participate in Rigged Systems: The Case of Military Commis-
sions (Geo. Wash. Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper, Paper No. 136, 2005),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=699085. See also Jesselyn Radack, Tortured Legal Eth-
ics: The Role of the Government Advisor in the War on Terrorism, 77 U. COLO. L. REv. 1
(2006).
122. 417 U.S. 733 (1974).
123. Id. at 761.
124. Id. at 744
125. Id. (quoting Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 140 (1953)).
126. Id. at 748-49 (quoting Swaim v. United States, 28 Ct. Cl. 173, 228 (1893)).
[Vol. 77
LESSONS FROM HOGWARTS
autonomy in military as in civilian life. 127 A medical professional like
Dr. Levy must, notwithstanding professional ethics, obey military orders
or risk imprisonment for three years at hard labor.
128
Why would law schools and law professors-important disciplinary
affiliates-resist the Solomon Amendment? Perhaps they wish to ensure
that the persons they credential will be able to practice, do, and live law
as demanded by the discipline. Perhaps they have reasonably chosen to
stop short of trying to prevent their graduates from practicing law in a
difficult environment, and have instead attempted to put their graduates
on notice that the military environment will complicate their ability to
fulfill disciplinary role obligations. 129 Perhaps law schools are signaling
this fact by modifying the conditions under which military recruitment
will take place. Perhaps they are also reasonably using such modifica-
tions to pressure an employer who will fund and direct the practice of
law to rethink stereotyped views that are out of synch with, or potentially
compromise, the ethical mandates of the profession. 130 Any given law
school's non-discrimination policy, seen from this perspective, is simply
a self-defense measure taken by a disciplinary affiliate to preserve disci-
plinary integrity against what it sees as a significant threat.
IV. THE DOCTRINAL HOME OF THE DISCIPLINE: THE RIGHT OF
ASSOCIATION
The reconfiguration of arguments in FAIR illustrates some difficul-
ties of bringing the discipline more clearly into an academic freedom de-
bate. Yet the effort is worthwhile, for there is a constitutional home for
disciplinary interests in academic freedom debates. That home is the
right of association.
At the most superficial level, association would seem to be a useful
concept for dealing with a discipline-based academic freedom argument.
The discipline is, after all, an intrinsically collective endeavor. More im-
127. See generally id. at 749-50.
128. Id. at 736.
129. Of course, the signal may discourage graduates from practicing law in the military. At
oral argument, Justice Scalia-and the government-expressed concern that law students will
be "driven off." Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 81, at 24. And one might wish to
debate whether it is wise to discourage the best and the brightest among law graduates from
practicing and bringing their influence to bear on the military environment. See Jane Mayer,
The Memo: How an Internal Effort to Ban the Abuse and Torture of Detainees Was Thwarted,
NEW YORKER, Feb. 27, 2006, at 32 (describing the efforts of Alberto J. Mora, former general
counsel of the United States Navy, to persuade the government to adopt a policy consistent
with his understanding of legal obligations). This is an important question for affiliates to ad-
dress.
130. FAIR Respondents' Brief, supra note 71, at 4-5.
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portantly, however, the values served by a right of association are appli-
cable to the discipline.131 In particular, the right of association protects
the freedom of lay communities to work cooperatively on projects of
self-definition1 32 and to create and interpret norms which serve as a
check on any governmental attempt to establish itself as the sole progeni-
tor of norms. 133 Disciplinary norms of truth can be a powerful counter-
vailing force to the way government would have us see and live in the
world. 134
As a constitutional home, the right of association is also pragmati-
cally suited to a discipline-based academic freedom argument because
analysis of associational rights claims appears to be fact-sensitive and not
rigorously category-driven. Conventional wisdom typically posits that,
despite its venerable origins, the right of association has not been satis-
factorily developed in constitutional doctrine. 135 That wisdom is un-
doubtedly accurate if one measures the sufficiency of an analytical
framework solely by whether the analysis employs doctrinal categories.
Because we each enjoy many overlapping relationships that take multiple
131. For excellent discussions of the values served by the right of association, see, e.g.,
FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION (Amy Gutmann ed., 1998); David Cole, Hanging With the Wrong
Crowd: Of Gangs, Terrorists, and the Right of Association, 1999 S. CT. REv. 203, 204 (argu-
ing that non-political, social associations are valuable in that they make political association
possible); Richard W. Garnett, The Story of Henry Adams's Soul: Education and the Expres-
sion of Associations, 85 MINN. L. REv. 1841, 1842-43 (2001) (discussing how associations
shape our souls, character, and values); Mazzone, supra note 14 (identifying the instrumental
values of associations as, among other things, being a training ground for political engage-
ment, teaching habits of cooperation, and producing social capital, i.e., the trust, norms, and
networks that make society function well); McGinnis, supra note 52, at 542-43 (explaining
that associations generate a complex and beneficial network of social norms that are needed to
support republican government); Shiffrin, supra note 117, at 865-70 (discussing social asso-
ciations and cooperation and arguing that what happens inside them, insofar as they foster
creativity, is significant). See also, Cover, supra note 4, at 32 (noting that freedom of associa-
tion is important because it protects the liberty of communities to create and interpret informal
law).
132. Shifflin, supra note 117, at 869.
133. See, e.g., Cole, supra note 131, at 229 (citing Tocqueville); Garnett, supra note 131,
at 1853-55 (explaining that associations are the hedgerows of civil society and the wrenches in
the works of government's hegemonizing ambitions); Mazzone, supra note 14, at 739 (arguing
that the state fears associations as a threat to the status quo or to its efforts to gin up patriotic
fervor); McGinnis, supra note 52, at 491 (discussing the mediating features of associations).
134. Cover, supra note 4, at 61-62 (arguing that government efforts to specify meaning in
educational institutions are especially dangerous because the capacity to generate law begins in
educational institutions).
135. The doctrine is open to different interpretations, as attested to by scholars, see, e.g.,
Shiffrin, supra note 117, and Brody, supra note 49; and courts, see, e.g., FAIR v. Rumsfeld,
291 F. Supp. 2d 269, 302 ("The difficulty in evaluating the constitutional significance of Plain-
tiffs' claim to academic freedom is that the precise contours of this First Amendment interest
are somewhat unclear."). For discussion of the history of the right of association, see the
sources cited supra in note 129, especially Mazzone.
[Vol. 77
LESSONS FROM HOGWARTS
forms, 136 the right of association cannot easily be categorized after the
fashion of standard constitutional analysis. 137 This very feature of asso-
ciational fights analysis enhances the value of the analysis in a disci-
pline-based academic freedom argument. It ensures that facts unique to
the discipline will carry special weight in the academic freedom de-
bate. 138
Thus, I make no attempt to argue that there is an existing category
of doctrine that precisely fits the only way of framing the academic free-
dom debate in associational rights terms. I merely offer a way of fram-
ing academic freedom disputes-with reference to the empirical reality
of the discipline-that highlights associational interests that have been
protected by the Supreme Court. The objective is to turn the academic
freedom debate temporarily away from a focus on speech and to estab-
lish that associational rights should not be a throw-away issue in the de-
bate. 139 A strong case for academic freedom can be based on associa-
tional rights and the unique nature and value of the discipline. 
140
136. Brody, supra note 49, at 857-59 (offering an excellent description of different organ-
izational structures and stakeholders within those structures and reminding that some organiza-
tions advocate for individual member views, some suppress individual voice, some are democ-
ratic, and some are rigidly hierarchical).
137. FAIR illustrates that in any given controversy there are multiple ways of framing as-
sociational rights to comport with doctrinal categories. FAIR might be framed, for example, as
a dispute in which the federal government seeks affiliation with and the right to use the re-
sources of a particular association. See Respondents' Oral Argument in Transcript of Oral Ar-
gument, supra note 81, at 26-55. It might as easily be framed as a dispute in which the federal
government has paid its dues through university funding and been accepted into an association
only to find that its university affiliation comes with restrictions on its speech and expressive
activities. See FAIR Petitioners' Brief, supra note 84, at 12 (noting that law schools wish to
associate with the government's money but not the rest of the government's activities); Tran-
script of Oral Argument, supra note 81, at 3 (characterizing the government as a donor desir-
ing access to law schools). Or it might be framed as a dispute in which law schools have
joined the federal government's funding network only to find that their affiliation comes with
the attached strings of the Solomon Amendment. See FAIR Respondents' Brief, supra note
71, at 17-18 (arguments based on Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991)). These examples do
not exhaust the framing options for the FAIR dispute.
138. In pressing its free speech constitutional claims, FAIR repeatedly rejected any claims
to unique status. See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 81, at 49 (rejecting excep-
tionalism) and at 35-36 (asserting that its principles would also apply to the university). This
opened the door to slippery-slope arguments that FAIR's theories would result in limitless
claims for constitutional protection against anyone in uniform. See, e.g., id. at 34 (regarding
the hypothetical about persons in uniform in the cafeteria), and at 60 (suggesting there is no
limit to the respondents' argument).
139. See, e.g., Edwards AAUP Brief, supra note 27, at 17-18 n.8. This brief's reference
to associational rights comes in the following throw-away footnote:
Even beyond the Establishment Clause issues at stake in the instant appeal, we note
the statute's additional deficiency of infringing the associational rights of teachers.
Their associational freedoms under the First Amendment may be violated by the re-
quirement that they provide instruction in doctrines which they, together with the
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The Supreme Court's decision in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale141
offers an associational rights analysis receptive to both the facts in FAIR
and a disciplinary perspective on the academic freedom debate. The dis-
pute in Dale arose when New Jersey attempted, through its public ac-
commodations law, to prohibit organizations like the Boy Scouts from
discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation. The Boy Scouts in-
sisted that it had an associational right to exclude gays from leadership
positions in the organization.
As a first step in its analysis, the Court in Dale held that the Boy
Scouts and its members would have constitutional protection against the
New Jersey law only if it engaged in an expressive "activity" of a collec-
tive or associational nature. 142 In evaluating the expressive nature of the
Boy Scouts' activities, the Court considered activities that were inter-
nally directed as well as those that might be directed to the wider
world. 143 It repeatedly referenced its intent to protect the "public or pri-
vate" expression of view-points or values. 144 The Court's conclusion
that "it seems indisputable that [the Boy Scouts organization] ... en-
gages in expressive activity"'145 was premised on a discussion of how the
Boy Scouts, by expression and by example, instills values internally in
responsible academic community, consider to be wholly antithetical to responsible
scholarship.
Id. See also Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976) (treating associational rights claim with
astonishing brevity). In FAIR, 126 S. Ct. 1297 (2006), an associational rights argument was
comprehensively developed early in the litigation and even adopted by the court of appeals. In
the Supreme Court, FAIR defended the court of appeals analysis in its brief, but in oral argu-
ment association was mentioned only two times. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 81,
at 11, 57. See also id. at 29 (expressing a concern for aiding discrimination, which implicates
rights of association).
140. Scholars who discuss academic freedom through the lens of associational rights
largely ignore the discipline, see, e.g., Horwitz, supra note 52 (focusing on the university), or
do not appreciate its full significance. For example, Hills, supra note 42, at 186, argues that a
faculty member is entitled "to a particular sort of decision-making institution and process: peer
review by members of his or her faculty applying the discipline's standards as they are under-
stood by the larger community of scholars within the relevant discipline." But he focuses on
"the bureaucratic context of university-wide tenure decisions" and develops a concept of aca-
demic freedom as a process right that fits only the tenure decision point and is located in the
university. Id.
141. Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
142. Id. at 648.
143. If expressive association analysis were to focus only on external messages, a disci-
pline might have difficulty using Dale to its advantage.
144. Id. at 648, 650. See also id. at 653 (describing messages to both youth members and
to the world).
145. Id. at 649.
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its youthful members. 146 In assessing the collective nature of the expres-
sion, the Court took note of general policies reflecting an internal, al-
though not unanimous, associational consensus. 147 Expressive activities
endorsing the consensus would be protected, according to the Court,
even though the Boy Scouts might not have organized itself solely or
primarily for the purpose of promoting that policy. 148 Moreover, protec-
tion would be extended to expression by example as well as through ver-
bal advocacy. Because the Boy Scouts chose to use its membership and
leadership qualifications as a vehicle for ensuring that it did not "pro-
mote homosexual conduct as a legitimate form of behavior," 149 the Court
shielded those qualifications against New Jersey's anti-discrimination
laws. Although the Court employed a formal "expressive association"
category in Dale, its interest was not in protecting the external, amplify-
ing effects of collective speech. Instead, it desired to protect the integrity
of key, internal structures (i.e., the leadership positions) of an organiza-
tion, the Boy Scouts.
Once the existence of an associational, expressive activity was es-
tablished, the Court's next analytical step was to consider whether the
New Jersey law significantly affected the Boy Scouts' activities. 150 Ac-
cepting at face value what the Boy Scouts identified as the values it
wished to inculcate in its youthful members, the Dale majority also said
that it was appropriate to give great weight-if not absolutely to defer-
to the Boy Scouts' "view of what would impair its expression." 151 Con-
cluding that there was a direct and immediate, rather than a merely inci-
dental, effect on associational rights, the Court held that even New Jer-
146. Id. at 649-650. Shiffrin, supra note 117, at 880 (the Scouts is organized to "influence
and to teach [its members, internal to the organization] how to think and act" and "to influ-
ence... character").
147. Id. at 655 (searching for a policy that counts as an "expressive association" notwith-
standing the fact that all members do not agree on every point).
148. Id. Compare Stevens, J., dissenting, 530 U.S. at 675 (the Boy Scouts should have to
link its policy of exclusion to "its central tenets or shared goals"), with Souter, J., dissenting,
530 U.S. at 701 (the Boy Scouts should have to show that they have unequivocally advocated a
clear position to receive constitutional protection). For discussions of whether messages must
be unequivocal to gain associational rights protection, see Shiffrin, supra note 117, at 847, and
Hills, supra note 42, at 208-12 (discussing how conventional doctrine may give less protection
to associations that tolerate dissension within their ranks than to associations that require all
members to adhere, in lock-step and consistently, over time, to a particular ideology).
149. Dale, 530 U.S. at 653 (asserting that Dale's presence in the organization would send
the message that homosexuality is legitimate); id. at 654-56 (emphasizing repeatedly the im-
portance of leadership positions within the organization).
150. See id. at 659 (using other phrases, for example, "significantly burden" or "severe
intrusion").
151. Id. at 651, 653 ("We need not inquire" beyond the Boy Scouts' assertion). The dis-
senters disagreed with the degree of deference accorded the Boy Scouts. Id. at 686.
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sey's compelling interest in eradicating discrimination would not shield
its law from constitutional invalidation.
152
Dale's way of addressing associational interests, or a variant of it,
seems well-suited to thinking about the interests of the discipline in the
academic freedom debate and in FAIR. 153 Like the Boy Scouts, the dis-
cipline of law is internally and collectively expressive. The discipline, of
course, does not internally express itself in fixed leadership criteria and
policies of the sort adhered to by the Boy Scouts, but it nonetheless has
its own form of internal integrity and collective expression. The disci-
pline of law is a "site[] for the generation and germination of thoughts
and ideas" 154 which exists only because of the shared norms and interac-
tions, over time, of scholars, practitioners, and other disciplinary affili-
ates. It holds itself together and develops through recurring acts of disci-
plinary affiliates that affirm the norms about what counts within the
discipline. Moreover, disciplinary interests are "private," thereby enjoy-
ing protection against governmental intrusion. Although public law
schools and law professors employed at public law schools may, like pri-
vate learned societies and practitioners, affiliate themselves with a disci-
pline, the discipline itself remains private. 155
The discipline is, of course, more amorphous in structure than the
Boy Scouts. Perhaps the Supreme Court will deem this difference to
have constitutional significance, 156 but persons relying on a discipline-
152. Id. at 659.
153. See supra text accompanying notes 75-92 for the argument that FAIR did make.
154. Shiffrin, supra note 117, at 840-41.
155. A recurring issue in academic freedom debate is whether public and private universi-
ties and professors will be treated differently, given that constitutional doctrine distinguishes
between state and private actors. See, e.g., David E. Bernstein, The Right of Expressive Asso-
cation and Private Universities' Racial Preferences and Speech Codes, 9 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS. J. 619 (2001) (private universities are protected if they adopt hate speech codes); David
P. Gearey, New Protections After Boy Scouts of America v. Dale: A Private University's First
Amendment Right to Pursue Diversity, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1583 (2004) (private universities
may implement race-based policies). Cf Brody, supra note 49, at 882-85. The disciplinary
focus of this article pulls public and private entities under an umbrella structure that should be
considered private under constitutional doctrine set forth in, for example, Brentwood Academy
v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288 (2001). See Halberstam, supra
note 14, at 834 (because "[tihe professional is understood to be acting under a commitment to
the ethical and intellectual principles governing the profession and is not thought of as free to
challenge the mode of discourse or the norms of the profession while remaining within the pa-
rameters of the professional discussion," the First Amendment protects the speech practices of
the profession against government regulation).
156. Brody, supra note 49, at 856 (noting that "the 'who?' aspect of association and group
speech" has been lost in constitutional analysis). For example, the issue of who or what entity
is entitled to litigate associational rights was not directly addressed in Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees,
468 U.S. 609 (1984). In Dale, the issue of who is entitled to litigate was also not addressed,
perhaps because the lawsuit began as a complaint by Dale against the Boy Scouts under New
Jersey public accommodations law. The Supreme Court also ducked the issue in FAIR. See
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based associational rights argument will insist that their associational in-
terests do not require embodiment in a corporate structure in order to be
given protection. 157 Indeed, it appears that the Supreme Court's usual
position is that associational rights belong to individuals rather than or-
ganizations. 158 Moreover, a large body of scholarly literature attests to
the constitutional value of associations that do not have a formal, corpo-
rate structure, especially in their ability to serve as a checking function
on government. 159 The discipline consists of both incorporated and in-
dividual affiliates, 160 and both should be able to assert protection for dis-
ciplinary, associational interests. 16 1 What should matter is whether a dis-
126 S. Ct. 1297, at 1303 n.2 (2006) (limiting analysis to FAIR's claims). See the discussion of
the question, as it relates to the FAIR litigation, in Morriss, supra note 12, at 441-51.
157. The reverse question is dealt with in standing cases, which ask whether an organiza-
tion will be permitted to litigate individual rights. See Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver.
Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977). See also Nathaniel Edmonds, Associational Standing for
Organizations with Internal Conflicts of Interest, 69 U. CHI. L. REv. 351 (2002). The FAIR
plaintiffs creatively constructed a formal corporate entity to represent academic interests not
because corporate status is a prerequisite to holding or defining associational rights, but be-
cause certain law schools and professors desired litigation anonymity.
158. See Brody, supra note 49, at 856 et seq. (the Court is most comfortable viewing an
association as the individual multiplied, as in NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S.
449 (1958)). Brody references Justice Souter's more recent comments in FEC v. Colorado
Republican Federal Campaign Commission, 533 U.S. 431, 448 n.10 (2001), as confirmation
that the Court continues to use individuals as the point of reference for associational rights
claims. For arguments that institutions ought to hold the associational right, see Hills, supra
note 42, and Horwitz, supra note 52, at 527-29 (avoiding competing claims to associational
rights protection).
159. See sources cited in supra note 155. Some of the literature deals with relationships
that are more amorphous than those of the discipline. See, e.g., Sam Fleischacker, Insignifi-
cant Communities, in FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION, supra note 131, at 273, 279-283 ("particle
communities" allow us to achieve a more thoughtful, honest understanding of ourselves);
George Kateb, The Value of Association, in FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION, supra note 131, at 35,
56 (arguing that the very act of forming an association creates a voice); Alan Ryan, The City as
a Site for Free Association, in FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION, supra note 131, at 314 (stating the
virtues of associations for the pleasure they give us in being able to do things together with
others). See also W. MICHAEL REISMAN, LAW IN BRIEF ENCOUNTERS (1999) (microlegal sys-
tems have significant effects on social order, the quality of life, and formation of personali-
ties).
160. Learned societies associated with specific disciplines are, for example, incorporated.
They typically do not enter litigation as primary parties, but rather file amicus briefs to present
information about topics being litigated. See, e.g. Brief Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner
by the American Association of University Professors, et al., United States v. Virginia, 518
U.S. 515 (1996) (No. 94-1941) (arguing that research on sex-based differences was not validly
interpreted by the state of Virginia) [hereinafter United States v. Virginia AAUP Brief].
161. The Supreme Court has denied associational rights protection to some amorphous
groups. See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999) (gangs); Dallas v. Stanglin,
490 U.S. 19 (1989) (dance halls). Yet the discipline is not as amorphous as, for example, a
cultural or identity group. See Brody, supra note 49 (discussing cultural and identity groups).
The expansive definition of expressive associations employed in Dale suggests that the Court
will pursue a pragmatic inquiry into the purposes and values of unique associations. See, e.g.,
Hills, supra note 42. See also Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in Roberts v. U.S. Jay-
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ciplinary affiliate can persuade a court with fact-based as well as doc-
trinal arguments that the harm to specific associational interests should
give rise to constitutional protection.
Different associations have different requirements of integrity. In
Dale, the Court did not protect an expressive activity per se but, rather,
the criteria by which key affiliates-those in leadership positions within
the Boy Scouts-were selected because those criteria were seen as essen-
tial to the organization's integrity. Membership policies are also conven-
tionally seen as crucial to an organization's self-definition. 
16 2
For the discipline, we should acknowledge the validity of Professor
Seana Valentine Shiffrin's observation that associational integrity is fo-
cused on the "internal cognitive life enjoyed within the association,"
163
the way in which voice power is distributed within the discipline, 164 and
whether those affiliated with the discipline trust their peers to be working
cooperatively in a project of self-definition. 165 In the discipline, the very
process of internal consensus formation must be protected. 166 Autono-
mous, authentic, and sincere deliberation of all affiliates must be pro-
tected against intrusive governmental regulation. 1
67
cees, 468 U.S. 609, 631-38 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment), on which many scholars seeking protection for amorphous associations rely. See,
e.g., Kateb, supra note 159; Shiffrin, supra note 117, at 876 (premising their arguments on
Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees).
162. See Shiffrin, supra note 117, at 870-73 (noting that membership is a critical factor,
one over which associations ought to have significant control). The Boy Scouts filed an
amicus brief in FAIR that attempted to make membership and leadership qualifications the
only relevant internal, structural factor. Brief of Boy Scouts of America as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Petitioners, FAIR, 126 S. Ct. 1297 (2006) (No. 04-1152).
163. Shiffrin, supra note 117, at 852.
164. Brody, supra note 49, at 865 (discussing how organizations can be typecast with ref-
erence to how they distribute voice power).
165. Shiffrin, supra note 117, at 868-69, 874 ("[T]hought formation in social groups...
relies on dynamics of trust and identification .... ). As Mazzone, supra note 14, says, one of
the signature traits of protected associations is the generation of social capital, i.e., trust,
norms, and networks that enable individuals to cooperate and to transmit culture and tradition.
166. Shiffrin, supra note 117, at 878 (emphasizing how these associations can fully
achieve their purposes "only when those who create also endorse the conditions of creation").
167. Id. at 840, 874 (criticizing a "government regulation[] that... exert[s] substantive
influence on mental content in ways that are indifferent to and attempt to bypass... [an affili-
ate's] authentic consideration of and conscious engagement with" an idea important to the dis-
cipline). External threats to associations and their members are problematic because they inter-
fere with "the autonomous agent's control over her mind" and with the "virtue of sincerity"--
i.e., "how she thinks about topics" and her ability "to reason about them consciously, sin-
cerely, authentically and directly"-which is essential to individual freedom. Id. at 854. She
argues that the Court ought also to consider how intrusions into associations "may come to
exert an influence on the thoughts (and actions) of the speaker in a way that surreptitiously
bypasses the agent's conscious consideration and does not reflect her sincere deliberation
about the matter." Id. at 859.
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In FAIR, individual affiliates needed to show something other than
that the Solomon Amendment interferes with a message promulgated by
the discipline of law. That interference, which counters the law school's
non-discrimination assurances with the message that "Uncle Sam does
not want you," 168 is not what constitutes the most significant threat to the
discipline. 169 The most significant threat is the Solomon Amendment's
interference with the ability of key affiliates to participate in forming a
disciplinary consensus through acts that conform to their view of disci-
plinary norms.
170
FAIR's affiliates needed to show that the Solomon Amendment
asks law schools and professors to forego equality and justice values that
they have historically struggled to define and to bring to bear on the ful-
fillment of role obligations central to the discipline. FAIR needed to
show that the Amendment prohibits one of the most forceful ways that
law school faculty might signal to law graduates and to the military that
the norms of the discipline and of the military are in tension and that law
graduates are being recruited to practice in an environment in which, if
ordered to do so, they will be expected to relinquish the ethic of their
discipline. FAIR needed to explain how the Amendment might lead to a
way of "doing" law that threatens the integrity of the discipline over time
by, for example, "provok[ing] guardedness [in the behavior and practices




Of course, a particular way of framing an argument, a particular
empirical reality, and an adherence to a particular mode of constitutional
analysis will not guarantee that any given party will prevail or lose in an
academic freedom controversy. Even if the Court had been persuaded
that the Solomon Amendment significantly burdens expressive, associa-
168. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 81, at 35.
169. Shiffrin, supra note 117, at 845 et seq.
170. Compare Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 609 (1984) (Jaycees did not prove
that admitting women would force alteration of what Brody calls "its voice"), with Runyon v.
McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 176 (1976) (quoting McCrary v. Runyon, 515 F.2d 1082, 1087 (4th
Cir. 1975)) ("[T]here is no showing that discontinuance of [the] discriminatory admission
practices would inhibit in any way the teaching in these schools of any ideas or dogma."). Cf
United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (in which there was arguably an attempt of a
disciplinary affiliate of "military science" to defend its practices against non-discrimination
mandates). The majority of the Court might have legitimately rejected the demonstrably inva-
lid "scientific" claims on which the pedagogy of military science rested. See United States v.
Virginia AAUP Brief, supra note 159.
171. Shiffrmn, supra note 117, at 875.
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tional activities of law schools and law professors, it would not necessar-
ily have concluded that disciplinary interests deserve protection. Asso-
ciational rights are not absolute, 172 and although Dale held that even a
compelling governmental interest will not justify a significant intrusion
on an expressive association, Dale did not involve the weighty interests
of the military.
173
This article only seeks to illustrate that the FAIR plaintiffs might
have been able to develop a more potent academic freedom argument by
bringing the discipline of law into an associational rights analysis and
that other academic freedom arguments should also incorporate the dis-
cipline and its associational interests.
If academic freedom debates continue on their present course, in
which the disciplinary focus is muted or obscured by arguments that rest
primarily on appeals to institutional autonomy or individual freedom, we
can expect to see continued, categorical confusion in constitutional doc-
trine. We can expect to see continued competitions between various
claimants to be the legitimate representative of academic freedom, in
which formal institutional structures take precedence over the discipli-
nary interests that give academic freedom its meaning. We can also ex-
pect to see a government that wishes to suppress a troublesome discipline
taking opportunistic advantage of the existence of differences of opinion
among disciplinary affiliates. 174 Moreover, we can expect to see profes-
sors pay less than optimal attention to how they live their ordinary pro-
172. The Court will, for example, take into account whether the discipline is too powerful
and dedicated to inappropriate activities, as it does in all associational rights analysis. The
dark side of associations is universally recognized. See, e.g., Brody, supra note 49, at 836-37;
Cole, supra note 131; Mazzone, supra note 14. Many scholars note the frequent conflict be-
tween equality, non-discrimination laws, and associational rights.
173. For discussions of judicial deference to the military, see, e.g., Frederick Block, Civil
Liberties During National Emergencies: The Interactions Between the Three Branches of
Government in Coping with Past and Current Threats to the Nation's Security, 29 N.Y.U.
REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 459 (2005); Samuel Issacharoff and Richard Pildes, Between Liber-
tarianism and Executive Unilateralism: An Institutional Process Approach to Rights During
Wartime, 5 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN LAW 1 (2004); Kim Lane Scheppele, Law in a Time of
Emergency: States of Exception and the Temptations of 9/11, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1001
(2004); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Checks and Balances in Wartime: American, British and Israeli
Experiences, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1906 (2004); Turley, supra note 120; Ingrid Brunk Wuerth,
The President's Power to Detain "Enemy Combatants: " Modern Lessons from Mr. Madison's
Forgotten War, 98 Nw. U. L. REV. 1567 (2004).
174. Cf Shiffrin, supra note 117, at 844 (regarding intrusions on associations-here of
university and discipline-that take advantage of and manipulate moral connections of trust or
put people on guard). Through the Solomon Amendment, for example, the government has
attempted to enlist law schools' home institutions-universities that have much in the way of
federal funding at stake-against the discipline of law itself. It has put each university to a
choice: accept federal funds for any purpose or program and apply the Solomon Amendment
throughout the entire university or protect a given discipline-even a discipline that does not
receive federal funds-and lose all federal funding throughout the university.
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fessional lives, from day to day, within the discipline-which will have
significant implications for future claims to academic freedom.
175
The Supreme Court does not arbitrarily protect or defer to institu-
tional judgments or institutions that it does not understand. It protects
them because it understands a given empirical reality and, therefore, the
true significance of alleged threats posed by forces external to an institu-
tion. 176 This is arguably the best explanation of why, for example, the
Court reached out to protect-with somewhat surprising applications of
constitutional doctrine-both the integrity of the Legal Services Corpora-
tion, in Legal Services Corp. v. Velasquez,177 and the normal govern-
mental processes of the state of Colorado, in Romer v. Evans.178 It is
why the Court has protected science against legislative creationist man-
dates. 179 It is why some Justices have recently emphasized that the insti-
tutional role of attorneys and professors may require adaptations in First
Amendment free speech protection for government-employed attorneys
and professors. 180 Precisely because the Court is sensitive to institu-
tional context, better efforts should be made to help the Court understand
the significance of the discipline in academic freedom debate. That un-
derstanding is essential if the Court is to be able to recognize when the
associational interests of disciplinary affiliates face-and ought to be
given protection against-a threat from a competing normative commu-
nity. 18
1
175. There is likely a direct correlation between the extent to which a discipline is per-
ceived to have integrity and the extent to which a court, or a legislature, or the public generally
is prepared to protect academic freedom of professors who speak controversially. It would
behoove professors, therefore, to take care with their discipline. I am indebted to Professor
Melissa Hart for the insight that how we frame the academic freedom debate is important not
only to how constitutional doctrine plays out in the notorious academic freedom cases that re-
ceive play in the press, but also to how professors see themselves in ordinary times and live
their ordinary lives.
176. Cf Horwitz, supra note 52, at 483-91 (discussing the value of academic freedom), at
496-88 (discussing the value of universities), and at 580 (suggesting that the Court has given
similar special treatment to other institutions, e.g., libraries, broadcasters, arts funding bodies).
Cf Hills, supra note 42, at 218-37 (laying out an argument for institutionally-specific constitu-
tional analysis).
177. 531 U.S. 533 (2001).
178. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
179. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 568 (1987); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97
(1968).
180. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 1962 (2006) (noting that the Court might
approach the free speech issue differently were a professor or a university a party to the dis-
pute); id at 1974-75 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that government attorneys must be treated
differently because they have ethical and constitutional obligations to speak up about certain
matters). For an interesting discussion that attempts to reconcile free speech doctrine with pro-
fessional obligations, see Halberstam, supra note 14.
181. See Schauer, supra note 6, at 922-23 (noting that the Supreme Court has been protect-
ing and deferring to deliberation-based institutions).
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